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LET MY ARM BE BROKEN OFF AT THE ELBOW
CHAD J. POMEROY*
When someone steals another’s clothes, we call them a thief.
Should we not give the same name to one who could clothe the
naked and does not? The bread in your cupboard belongs to the
hungry; the coat unused in your closet belongs to the one who
needs it; the shoes rotting in your closet belong to the one who
has no shoes; the money which you hoard up belongs to the
poor.1
Introduction
The largest producer of nuts in the United States.2 A multi-billion dollar
insurance and financial services company.3 The fourteenth largest radio
chain in the country.4 “A catering company, a major television channel, an
* Turcotte R.C. Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law.
1. Basil the Great, quoted in Ask a Franciscan: Disposing of Excess Goods,
FRANCISCAN MEDIA, https://www.franciscanmedia.org/ask-a-franciscan-disposing-of-excessgoods/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
2. David Van Biema, Kingdom Come, TIME, Aug. 4, 1997, at 50.
3. See BENEFICIAL LIFE INS. CO., http://www.beneficialfinancialgroup.com (last visited
Feb. 9, 2018). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church”) owns
Beneficial Life Insurance Company, which had assets of approximately $3.3 billion in 2010,
“according to the State of Utah Insurance Department.” The Mormon Global Business
Empire, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2012, 1:25 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
photo-essays/2012-07-12/the-mormon-global-business-empire. Additionally, Ensign Peak
Advisors is an investment fund of the church, with managers “specializ[ing] in international
equities, cash management, fixed income, quantitative investment, and emerging markets.”
Id. “One of Ensign Peak’s vice presidents” told a local Utah newspaper, in 2006, that
“billions of dollars change hands every day.” Id.
4. See Biema, supra note 2. The church’s holding company, Deseret Management,
owns numerous media properties, including “a TV station, 11 radio stations, a publishing
and distribution company,” and a successful book publishing business (which routinely
enters into financial contracts with the church’s leaders). The Mormon Global Business
Empire, supra note 3. The size of this radio conglomerate is likely different now, as the
church sold a number of its radio stations for $505 million in 2011 in order “to focus more
on Internet ventures.” Caroline Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, BLOOMBERG (July
18, 2012, 8:45 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-18/how-themormons-make-money [hereinafter Winter, How the Mormons Make Money]. It is not
possible to know whether this is accurate, however, as churches are not generally required to
release financial information. See infra Part I for a discussion of charitable disclosures and
the lack of mandatory church disclosure. Given this widespread lack of information, I will
cite to what authority I can regarding the financial details of the various church entities
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internet marketing company.”5 And real estate! Enormous real estate
holdings in Hawaii,6 Montana,7 Nebraska,8 Oklahoma,9 Texas,10
Washington,11 and Wyoming.12 Probably more land in both Utah and
Florida than any other private actor.13 Internationally, there are major
discussed herein. However, by way of a standing admission, I freely acknowledge that many
of these numbers are uncertain.
5. Brandon Young, Follow the Profit: A Guide to the LDS Church’s For-Profit
Companies, LDS DAILY (May 4, 2016), http://www.ldsdaily.com/church-lds/follow-profitguide-lds-churchs-profit-companies.
6. See Duane Shimogawa, Mormon Church’s Company Buys Property, PAC. BUS.
NEWS (Oct. 19, 2016, 12:23 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/news/2016/10/
19/mormon-churchs-company-buys-property.html (indicating ownership of tens of
thousands of acres and other property worth tens of millions of dollars). On one of its tracts
in Oahu, the LDS Church runs the “Polynesian Cultural Center . . . [which] features daily
luaus, (except on Sunday), an ‘Island Buffet,’ seven simulated Polynesian villages, Samoan
tree-climbing lessons, and Tahitian spear-throwing lessons.” The Mormon Global Business
Empire, supra note 3. Tickets cost between $35 and $230. Id. In addition to these land
interests and its amusement park, one of the LDS Church’s “for-profit arms, Hawaii
Reserves, even runs a water management company, sewage treatment works, and two
cemeteries,” as well. Id.
7. See Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of over 50,000 acres).
8. See Associated Press, LDS Church Buys 88,000 Acres in Nebraska, DESERET NEWS
(Salt Lake City) (Oct. 7, 2004, 10:13 AM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/595096557/
LDS-Church-buys-88000-acres-in-Nebraska.html.
9. See Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of 50,000 to 70,000 acres).
10. See Commercial Farms, MONEYINZION (June 18, 2014), http://www.moneyinzion.
wordpress.com/2014/06/18/commerical-farms/ (indicating ownership of approximately
120,000 acres).
11. See Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of approximately 85,000 acres).
12. See Commercial Farms, supra note 10 (indicating ownership of approximately
68,000 acres).
13. See Statistics of the LDS by Temples of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, LDS CHURCH TEMPLES, https://ldschurchtemples.org/statistics/units/unitedstates/utah/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (indicating that there are 4791 wards and eighteen
temples in Utah). A ward is a geographically limited congregation. Lee Davidson, In Utah,
Mormon Chapels Are Here, There and Everywhere, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:26
AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=58325676&itype=CMSID. While not every
ward has a building, there are thousands of separate buildings within the state of Utah. See,
e.g., id. (indicating that there are at least 1210 ward buildings in the three largest counties in
Utah). This is in addition to the campus of Brigham Young University, a large missionary
training center, numerous storehouses, and an unknowable number of other buildings
(including a $2 billion megamall developed by the LDS Church and completed in March
2012, which features a retractable glass roof and includes almost 100 stores and restaurants,
office towers, and hundreds of luxury apartments and condominiums). See, e.g., Young,
supra note 5; The Mormon Global Business Empire, supra note 3; Tony Semerad, City
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investments in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico,14 and
about as much land in Britain as the Crown Estate.15
Take these assets, add billions in stocks and bonds and other securities,
and include another $6-$8 billion per year of donated funds.16 To most of
us, such a collection of assets and income probably seems appropriate for a
large, public corporation.
However, as the preceding footnotes make clear, the entity described is
not a titan of industry but is instead a church. And that is the starting point
for this Article: though the American legal system is deferential toward
Creek Center: A Mall Built to Last and to Lead, but Will It?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 11,
2015, 12:50 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=2488265&itype=CMSID; Caroline
Winter et al., The Money Behind the Mormon Message, THE SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2012,
12:18 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=54478720&itype=CMSID [hereinafter
Winter et al., Money Behind the Mormon Message]; Young, supra note 5. Targeting Florida,
the LDS Church purchased about 295,000 acres of land in Brevard, Orange, and Osceola
counties in 1950 and kept on buying. Amy Martinez, The Mormon Church – Land Lord,
FLA. TREND (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.floridatrend.com/article/17957/the-mormonchurch--land-lord. In March 2014, it purchased another 383,000 acres for $562,000,000. Id.
On its 290,000 acre Deseret Ranch, the LDS Church “keeps 44,000 cows and 1,300 bulls”; it
maintains “1,700 acres of citrus trees”; and it operates “timber, sod, and fossilized-seashell
businesses.” The Mormon Global Business Empire, supra note 3.
14. See Claire Provost, From Book to Boom: How the Mormons Plan a City for 500,000
in Florida, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2017, 2:59 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/
jan/30/from-book-to-boom-how-the-mormons-plan-a-city-for-500000-in-florida;
Winter,
How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4; Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of
approximately 100,000 acres in Alberta).
15. See Catherine Pepinster, Mormons Pay £30m for Prime British Farmland,
INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2001), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/mormonspay-30m-for-prime-british-farmland-9215914.html.
16. Peter Henderson, Insight: Mormon Church Made Wealthy by Donations, REUTERS:
SPECIAL REPORTS (Aug. 12, 2012, 6:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usapolitics-mormons/insight-mormon-church-made-wealthy-by-donations-idUSBRE87B05W0
812; Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4. This is in addition to the income
from the aforementioned assets. For the basis of these estimates, see Provost, supra note 14
(discussing numbers provided by Ryan Cragun, associate professor of sociology at the
University of Tampa, who estimated real estate assets in excess of $35,000,000,000 and
tithing income of as much as $7,000,000,000 per year). Similarly, in 1997, Time estimated
the total value at $30 billion and annual tithing at $5 billion. See Winter, How the Mormons
Make Money, supra note 4. More recently, Reuters and Professor Cragun estimated a net
worth of $40 billion and tithing of $8 billion. See id. (quoting Keith McMullin—the Chief
Executive Officer of Deseret Management Corporation (“DMC”), one of the LDS Church’s
affiliated entities—as indicating that DMC had annual revenue of approximately $1.2
billion, though noting that McMullin later retracted that claim through an LDS spokesman,
without clarification).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

456

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:453

religion and churches, it is undeniable that the Church of Latter-day
Saints—and other like organizations—are not just churches. They are,
instead, important participants in the market economy, some of them global
business enterprises of major proportions.17 This twinning of profit and
spirit is seamless for many religions, with numerous modern churches
preaching a “prosperity gospel” that promises spiritual and temporal
blessings in return for donations.18 Still other churches—such as the Church
of Scientology—directly charge for religious services that are “necessary”
for spiritual improvement and advancement in the church hierarchy.19 And
still others accumulate their own reserves of property and wealth.20 This

17. The number of entities and subsidiary organizations owned or controlled by the
LDS Church is not publicly available information; the organization owns its property and
businesses through an undisclosed network of subsidiaries, trusts, and foreign entities. See
Provost, supra note 14. It is difficult to determine which of these are “for-profit” and which
are “non-profit” and to know if the label even matters, given that some of the nonprofit
entities appear to generate significant profits. See Winter et al., Money Behind the Mormon
Message, supra note 13 (discussing the Polynesian Cultural Center, which had to begin
“paying commercial property taxes in 1992 when the Land and Tax Appeal Court of Hawaii
ruled that the” center was not actually charitable in nature). Whatever the ultimate number of
entities or sub-entities—and whether they are designated as profit or non-profit and however
they are owned or tied to the set of entities that constitute the LDS Church—this Article will
refer to the integrated body of church entities as a whole. This whole is overseen by an
individual called a “Prophet” who is the most senior “Apostle,” designated by his length of
service. See Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4. There are twelve
Apostles, in addition to the prophet, and this group collectively oversees a professional class
of church leaders consisting of hundreds of “General Authorities” employed to run the
religious and non-religious activities of the church, often through the hiring and supervision
of business managers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals. See id. In total, the
organization employs thousands (or perhaps tens of thousands) of employees. See id.
(quoting the CEO of DMC indicating that just that one entity has “2,000 to 3,000
employees”).
18. See Lidiya Mishchenko, In Defense of Churches: Can the IRS Limit Tax Abuse by
“Church” Impostors?, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2016) (“Under the prosperity
gospel, church membership may actually be conditioned on provision of regular donations,
or ‘tithes,’ and if a congregant is struggling in their life, they may be told that God is
punishing them and they need to donate even more money to the church.”).
19. Id. The last reported income of the Church of Scientology was approximately $300
million per year, and the average megachurch in 2008 generated annual income of over $6.5
million. Id. at 364.
20. See, e.g., Earthly Concerns, ECONOMIST (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.economist.
com/node/21560536 (indicating that Timothy Dolan, owner of a corporation sole in his
position of Cardinal-Archbishop of New York, is believed to be the largest landowner in
Manhattan).
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asset assemblage leads, ineluctably, to enormous income and wealth
concentrated in the hands of religious organizations across America.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with religious organizations
amassing wealth, it is troubling that they do so while enjoying
informational and tax advantages not afforded to other entities. However,
these benefits are not “tax advantages”; these are “tax advantages that are
expressly made unavailable to other, competing, profit-seeking entities that
suffer greatly due to their comparative disadvantage.” Indeed, this Article’s
foundational claim is these advantages are so significant that they have
come to shape the aims and actions of many religions, effectively bending
the nature of many organizations away from traditionally religious and
charitable work and toward profit-seeking.21 This state is both unintended
and inequitable. As such, these advantages should be eliminated.
Before describing any recommended changes to these tax benefits, it is
critical to first understand how the American tax system treats churches. As
explained in Part I, our legal and tax system is laced with a series of
benefits and exemptions that favor churches over virtually every other kind
of entity. These benefits permit churches to bring in funds under the
auspices of a non-profit entity and then direct those funds to for-profit
endeavors.22 Indeed, not only are churches permitted to do this, they are
21. This is a systemic issue potentially affecting all churches, and I provide numerous
examples throughout this Article. The LDS Church is referenced a number of times not
because it is unique but because it appears to be a particularly apt example of the broader
issues discussed herein.
22. In particular, there is nothing preventing a church from taking its “tithes” and
“investing” them in for-profit businesses (wholly owned or otherwise). The effects and
associated advantages of having both for-profit and non-profit channels of revenue are
discussed at length. See infra Section II.B. To be fair, churches will likely counter that such
an argument is misplaced, claiming that there is no mixing of profit and non-profit funds.
See Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4 (quoting McMullin that “not one
penny of tithing” flows through to the LDS church’s for-profit entities or endeavors).
Though this kind of response has some visceral appeal, it can be rather easily disposed of
because of the fungible nature of money. A centrally run entity can attempt to silo profit and
non-profit activities, but all activities (whatever their nature) ultimately accrue to the benefit
of the whole when that whole is owned by the same entity. Indeed, it is simply not
functionally possible to separate funds in this manner, especially in the context of a related
series of associations that ultimately belong to a single, centrally managed entity. In such a
situation, the ultimate level of ownership controls every entity, all of which are legally and
technically permitted to transfer funds from one entity to another. A business can segregate
its subsidiaries and sources of income, on paper, for a variety of business or legal reasons,
but the benefits flowing to any one part (i.e., via tax-free funding or an exemption from
property tax or from any other source) necessarily helps every other related part by freeing
resources and ensuring financial flexibility and strength throughout the entire entity. In other
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incentivized to do so. Because these organizations are uniquely permitted to
build up networks of interlocking entities of non-profit and for-profit
subsidiaries and freely funnel funds from one to the other, churches are
effectively permitted to own profit-seeking entities that have an intrinsically
lower cost of capital than their competitors. This system ensures that
church-affiliated companies will always enjoy a superior market position.23
In the face of such economic opportunity, how could any entity not do what
these churches have done? It is difficult to blame churches for taking
advantage of a U.S. system of religious tax exemption that effectively
guarantees them preferential returns on church-sourced funds when those
funds are directed to profit-seeking instead of charity.24
Blameworthy or not, this tax structure is problematic. Such a marketoriented incentive discourages churches from expending funds in pursuit of
charitable goals. The American economy is a capitalistic one, rewarding
capital, among other things. Permitting churches, with their lower cost of
capital, to access markets that reward capital means that every dollar
devoted to the needy is not being devoted to its highest and best use—from
an internal rate-of-return perspective. That, of course, will lead to “underwords, because money is fungible and decision-making is integrated, the entities
unavoidably act as an effectively incorporated unit, supporting each other and affecting the
market economy in a perceivably unitary fashion. An excellent, if eccentric, example is the
way that the LDS Church asks its members to serve unpaid missions and then assigns them
to work at revenue-generating enterprises. See Winter, How the Mormons Make Money,
supra note 4. It is clear, in such a situation, that people are donating to an entity that is using
those ostensibly charitable donations to generate revenue and/or profit for other related
entities. To claim, in such a situation, that religious tithes or offerings are not going toward
revenue generation or profit-seeking is untenable. Some church officials have expressly
acknowledged the economic truth of this in less guarded moments. See, e.g., id. (quoting
McMullin as indicating that funds do, from time to time, flow throughout the LDS Church’s
family of entities to help stanch losses in one or another part of the organization).
23. Or perhaps that they will be able to dominate markets with extremely low profit
margins (such as is increasingly the case with traditional print media).
24. It is worth emphasizing a few important disclaimers at this point. First, I do not
claim that all churches skew away from charity and toward profit-seeking. There are many
churches that do not, likely for a whole host of cultural, social, geographic, and other reasons
that are outside the scope of this Article. Second, even as to those churches that have clearly
invested more resources in profit-seeking than in traditionally charitable activity, the
arguments and conclusions contained herein do not necessarily indicate that these entities are
behaving “badly.” In fact, by explicating non-charitable activity in terms of the incentives
embodied in the Internal Revenue Code (the “IRC”), I am stripping such behavior of moral
weight. I am not arguing that any given church is immoral—I am arguing that many
churches are amoral, rationally pursuing the economic advantages built into our tax system
without regard to any underlying spiritual or moral code.
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spending” on charity, which is deleterious to the public policy underlying
the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code.
The United States was clear in its reasoning when it made the decision
that churches should enjoy special tax status: the government explicitly
decided to forego the substantial tax revenues associated with funds raised
and expended by churches because it believed that these entities—of all
entities—would use those funds to do the “good works” that would
otherwise be the responsibility of government.25 Taxing a church on funds
that it could use to set up an orphanage makes no sense, for example, if
such taxation would force the church to abandon its plans for the orphanage
and leave the government to ultimately clean up the remains itself. Indeed,
the U.S. government—through Congress, the judiciary, and the IRS—has
been extraordinarily generous in its treatment of churches in connection
with tax law, both in terms of how it has interpreted and applied tax laws
and rules to churches and in terms of how much tax money the government
has foregone. But that attempt to generate private party charity is defeated,
at great expense to the American taxpayer, when churches invest instead of
help.
Even more troubling than the undercutting of U.S. tax policy is when
churches use their tax-exempt funds to engage in massive business
operations instead of directing funds toward charity. This does actual
damage to the broader market economy. As discussed in Part II below,
when non-taxed organizations compete against ordinary business entities in
the market, they operate under different economic constraints and disrupt
the normal functioning of capital supply and demand, fundamentally
distorting the market place. By tapping into untaxed capital, these nontaxed businesses put downward pressure on the rates of return that would
otherwise be available in an equally constructed market place, which
burdens other economic actors. Accordingly, it is not simply that charitable
entities undermine the intent of the IRC when they engage in profit-seeking
activities—it is that by doing so, they distort the economy and introduce
inherent market inefficiencies.
Part III makes recommendations intended to resolve this problem as it
manifests itself in the context of churches. These suggestions largely
revolve around increased transparency and the potential imposition of a tax
on funds that are not spent on charitable endeavors. Laying bare the
finances of these organizations will enable all stakeholders in charitable
25. See infra Section I.A. for a more nuanced discussion of the policy behind providing
so many tax subsidies and advantages to churches.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

460

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:453

giving—including, importantly, U.S. taxpayers—to see how their
investments are being spent. Furthermore, taxing non-charitable funds
would ensure that our tax system functions the way it is intended—without
favor or distortion.
I. Widows & Orphans
The United States government has decided that certain entities should
enjoy favorable tax status.26 This encompasses a variety of entities,
including churches and religious organizations.27 The economic calculus
behind this political decision is intuitive: if an organization is going to
dedicate itself and its funds to fulfilling public needs that would otherwise
have to be served by the government itself, then the government should not
tax the resources that are going to fill those needs.28 Often, however,
charitable activity is not what is happening. The policy of tax exemption for
churches costs the U.S. taxpayer billions and billions of dollars every year
and is accomplishing significantly less than intended because it is, in fact,
being subverted by groups that direct those tax-free funds to for-profit
enterprises instead of charitable ends.29
A. The Big Idea and the Law
Tax exemption for favored entities is not a novel idea. It predates the
formation of the republic itself; early settlers formed all sorts of “charitable
and other ‘voluntary’ associations.”30 That fervor continues to this day,
26. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012); Mishchenko, supra note 18.
27. See Mishchenko, supra note 18.
28. See id. at 1371.
29. See id. at 1364 (“All of America is subsidizing these jets and mansions.”).
30. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective,
SOI BULLETIN (IRS), Winter 2008, at 105, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf.
Alexis de Tocqueville had a penchant for this, noting in 1831 that
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form
associations. They have not, only commercial and manufacturing companies, in
which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, -- religious,
moral, serious, futile . . . I have often admired the extreme skill with which the
inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to the
exertions of a great many men, and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it.
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 130-31 (Henry Reeve Trans., Sever &
Francis 1863); see also Donald L. Sharpe, Unfair Business Competition and the Tax on
Income Destined for Charity: Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 367, 369 (1996)
(“From the very beginning, tax law in the United States has recognized the unique role
played by private, nonprofit charitable organizations by affording them exemption from
tax.”).
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reflected throughout our country’s various iterations of income tax rules
and regulations, all of which contain provisions favorable to “non-profits”
or “charities.”31 The focus of this Article is the suite of benefits conferred
upon churches, but it is helpful to start with the broader concept of taxation
of charities and non-profits.32
The structure of tax exemption granted to charities and voluntary
organizations revolves around numerous different provisions of the IRC
and has evolved through legislation enacted between 1894 and 1969 and
various judicial decisions interpreting that legislation.33 Over that period,
the government built the basic outlines of charitable taxation, identified taxexempt entities, set forth certain activities of exempt organizations that
would be subject to taxation, and created categories of tax-exempt
organizations.34
Though much has changed over time, the basic contours of tax
exemption have stayed the same and are today largely encompassed within
I.R.C. § 501, particularly subsection (c)(3), which governs charities.35
Broadly speaking, any organization that falls within this subsection will not
have to pay income tax and can also receive tax-deductible donations.36
31. See infra Section I.B.
32. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (exempting religious, educational, charitable,
scientific, or literary organizations; organizations that test for public safety; organizations
that prevent cruelty to children or animals; and organizations that foster national or
international amateur sports competition).
33. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 106. See generally Harvey P. Dale & Roger
Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX LAW. 331
(2015) (reviewing in detail the “main federal income tax rules affecting charitable
contributions”).
34. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 106–09 (tracing the evolution of the relevant
federal income tax law from the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 to the Pension
Protection Act of 2006).
35. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Private foundations are also included within § 501(c)(3).
Many other kinds of entities are exempted from taxation under other subsections of § 501.
See, e.g., id. §§ 501(a), (c) (listing many different kinds of exempt organizations, including,
for example, corporations organized by an Act of Congress, social welfare organizations,
domestic fraternal beneficiary societies, and supplemental unemployment benefit trusts); see
also David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons,
67 TAX LAW. 451, 454 (2014) (“[T]here are more than 29 different types of tax-exempt
entities in section 501(c) alone and by some counts more than 70 in all.”). The arguments set
forth in this Article are uniquely addressed to charities, which are governed by § 501(c)(3),
and churches particularly, for reasons discussed below.
36. Such entities are also theoretically prohibited from using their tax-exempted income
to benefit individuals associated with the organization. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30,
at 106. Two additional, important nuances were introduced into this statutory regime in 1950
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These are the two primary tax benefits of qualifying under § 501(c)(3) and
are, of course, valuable. Being exempt from income tax is easily
appreciated and of enormous importance, but the other benefit is also
significant.37 The policy behind permitting tax-deductible donations is to
subsidize (and thereby stimulate) charitable giving, but the wider
implications of being able to raise funds tax-free are rarely considered or
understood, as this Article argues.38
For the moment, it suffices to point out these advantages specifically in
the context of churches. They often pay little or no property tax, they
receive sales tax exemptions, they benefit from a related business income
tax subsidy, and their employees’ compensation is often exempted from tax
under the parsonage exemption.39
and 1969, respectively. “Before the 1950s, tax-exempt organizations could earn tax-free
income from both mission-related activities and commercial business activities that were
unrelated to the purpose for which they were exempt . . . .” Id. at 107. Motivated by a
concern that this afforded these entities an “unfair competitive advantage over taxable
entities,” however, “Congress established the ‘unrelated business income tax’ (UBIT))” in
1950, which imposed a tax on unrelated business income (i.e., income that is not
“‘substantially related’ to the organization’s exempt purpose”). Arnsberger et al., supra note
30, at 107; see also Jennifer Anne Spiegel, Sierra Club: Rationalizing the Royalty Exception
to the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1720–33 (1995) (noting
the original basis for UBIT legislation as a desire to prevent unfair competition, though also
noting the evolving nature of how courts and scholars view and apply the relevant law).
Then, in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress introduced legislation intended to bring
“private foundations” to heel. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107; The Role of
Foundations Today and the Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 upon Foundations:
Hearing Before the Comm. On Fin., Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on
Foundations, 93d Cong. (Comm. Print 1978). Private foundations are “defined in the
negative, as a charity that cannot qualify as a public charity.” Roger Colinvaux, Charity in
the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 1, 54 (2011). Broadly
speaking, the idea is that charities that are overseen by a donor or service-based community
that is public in nature will be effectively policed thereby. See id. “By the 1960s, there was a
growing perception among lawmakers that private foundations, [in contrast to public
charities,] with their small networks of financers and administrators were less accountable to
the public than traditional charities.” Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107. As such,
Congress introduced rules taxing certain investment income and requiring minimum
distributions. Id. at 108. Though the specifics of UBIT and of private foundation governance
and taxation are outside the scope of this Article, these concepts, as broadly interpreted, bear
upon the thesis discussed herein. See infra Section II.B, Part III.
37. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), 501 (2012). The untaxed source of capital is made possible
because donations to charities are deductible by the donor.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See Miller, supra note 35, at 492 (describing “the full array of tax subsidies: (1) a
charitable deduction for donors, (2) donor deductions for gifts of long-term capital gain
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Why does America voluntarily forego tens of billions of dollars every
year in tax revenue, and why has it historically been so open and solicitous
of these kinds of organizations?40 This kind of examination is easiest to
undertake in the context of churches because these charities have one of the
longest histories of special treatment, and because they appear to have
enjoyed tax benefits in almost every culture and every time period.41
property, (3) absence of tax on donor’s built-in gain appreciated capital assets . . . , (4)
absence of tax on the organization on donations, (5) absence of gift tax on the donor, and (6)
freedom from tax on the organization’s non-UBTI [unrelated business taxable income]
income”); see also Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Oversight of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 98–99 (1987) (statement
of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration,
complaining that nonprofits enjoy numerous competitive advantages, including tax
exemptions; subsidized mail rates; special treatment under social security, unemployment
insurance, and minimum wage laws). But see MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A DESTRO,
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A P LURALISTIC SOCIETY 767–89 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing tax subsidy
and tax expenditure metrics as applied to religious organizations). This Article focuses on
churches (and the integrated auxiliaries that are lumped with them for tax purposes); finer
distinctions between different kinds of religious organizations do not ultimately affect the
underlying problems or proposed solutions discussed here. Not all of these advantages are
federal in nature. For instance, each state is responsible for classifying religious entities and
for deciding which of those categories qualify for property tax exemptions or discounts.
Whatever the nature of that framework, however, the real and personal property owned by a
“church” is often exempted from state and local property taxes. See generally Michael K.
Ryan, Note, A Requiem for Religiously Based Property, 89 GEO. L.J. 2139 (2001). See also,
e.g., Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (holding the
parsonage exception violates of the establishment clause of the First Amendment); City of
Austin v. Univ. Christian Church, 768 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. 1988) (deciding whether a
parking lot attached to the church is exempt).
40. See Ryan T. Cragun et al., Research Report: How Secular Humanists (and Everyone
Else) Subsidize Religion in the United States, FREE INQUIRY, June/July 2012, at 39, 39,
http://users.clas.ufl.edu/kenwald/rpp/cragun.pdf (estimating an annual tax subsidy to
churches of over $70 billion per year). This estimate is rough and likely overstates the value
of tax deductions tied to church tithes, given that most tithe payers likely claim the standard
deduction (instead of an itemized deduction) and given that many transfers to churches
would likely qualify as untaxable gifts. See 4 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §
31:12, Westlaw (“Regardless of the religious imperative to pay a tithe, its contribution is
typically tax deductible to the donor because there is no legal obligation to make a payment
of tithing. As a gift, it is not included in the income of the recipient religious organization.”).
That said, there is simply no way to track this information, and it is highly likely that
churches in fact receive billions of dollars of value via the charitable deduction and billions
of dollars of value via other tax advantages.
41. See John W. Whitehead, Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 522–45 (1991). Indeed, some scholars believe that “tax
exemption of church property is probably as ancient as taxation itself.” LEO PFEFFER,
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Analyzing the long-term pattern of the taxation of churches throughout
history, governments have exempted charities because they generally
believed that these organizations devoted their property to helping the
public, broadly defined as activities that provide physical support to those
in need.42 That is, “[t]he traditional explanation for why public charities
have been removed from the tax rolls is that ‘they relieve the government
from the burden of performing certain services or providing certain goods
to the public.’”43 Churches and other charities devote their resources to
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 210 (rev. ed. 1967); see also Claude W. Stimson, The
Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 416
(1934). “It has always been the case, clear back to the priests of Egypt and beyond them into
the coulisses of prehistory. The priests and Levites were exempt from taxation . . . , but . . .
[it] is merely . . . a long-existing custom.” DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT
PAY TAXES 5 (1977); Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 973-74 (1999); Whitehead, supra, at 524–28. Foreshadowing the
animating thesis of this Article, this exemption has long been economically significant in the
context of organized religion:
[T]he priests . . . turned [contributed wealth] into productive or investment
capital, and became the greatest agriculturists, manufacturers and financiers of
the nation. Not only did they hold vast tracts of land; they owned a great
number of slaves, or controlled hundreds of laborers, who were hired out to
other employers, or worked for the temples in their divers trades from the
playing of music to the brewing of beer. The priests were also the greatest
merchants and financiers of Babylonia; they sold the varied products of the
temple shops, and handled a large proportion of the country's trade; they had a
reputation for wise investment, and many persons entrusted their savings to
them, confident of a modest but reliable return. They made loans on more
lenient terms than the private money-lenders . . . .
1 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 233 (1954).
42. This is stereotypically thought of as helping orphans, the indigent, and the elderly.
See, e.g., Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz.,. 1, c. 4 (Eng.), repealed by Mortmain and
Charitable Uses Act 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 42 (Eng.); see John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of
Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
363, 377 (1991). The record indicates that the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 centered on
public benefit, specifically with curing poverty in mind. See John P. Persons et al., Criteria
for Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1913 (Dep’t of Treasury
ed., 1977). But see Comm’rs for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] AC
531 (HL) 559 (holding that “charitable” and “pious” were synonymous with “godly” in
English law). This is also known as the “public benefit” theory. See ARIENS & DESTRO,
supra note 39, at 739. And “[t]he requirement that a charitable use be dedicated to the
benefit of the public is well established in both English and American law.” Id. at 751 (citing
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990)).
43. Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to
Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 129 (2011) (quoting Robert
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public needs, “eas[ing] a burden on government” so the government should
not pressure, or tax, those resources.44 Given the substantial history
involved and the broad scope of this issue (taxation as applied to charitable
constructs), there are many different factors—besides amelioration of
governmental burden—that have contributed to this targeted exemption and
subsidy.45 Particularly as it relates to churches, many proponents have
argued that religion generally benefits society by inducing love and
benevolence,46 promoting stability,47 fostering tolerance,48 teaching
morality, and otherwise providing the cornerstone of a “civil society . . .

Paine, The Tax Treatment of International Philanthropy and Public Policy, 19 AKRON TAX J.
1, 12 (2004)); see also Miller, supra note 35, at 457 (“One leading rationale for the tax
exemption for 501(c)(3)s is that the money earned and spent by exempt organizations
provides a public service that saves the federal government funds it would otherwise
spend.”) (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., JCX-29-0605,
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 28 (Comm. Print 2005); Sharpe, supra note 30, at 376 (“[T]he
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19
(1938)). But see Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1381 (1991) (“Due primarily to the vast array of
activities to which the exemption has been applied, it has defied all past attempts to
formulate a synthesizing concept of charitable.”).
44. Robert Paine, The Tax Treatment of International Philanthropy and Public Policy,
19 AKRON TAX J. 1, 12 (2004); see also, e.g., Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax
Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 RESEARCH
PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS,
supra note 42, at 2025, 2033-34; BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS 8–18 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 7th ed. 1998)).
45. In particular, the non-taxation of religious entities and organizations is multifaceted. See, e.g., DURANT, supra note 41; King, supra note 41, at 973–76; ROUNDELL
PALMER, EARL OF SELBORNE, ANCIENT FACTS AND FICTION: CONCERNING CHURCHES AND
TITHES 194 (London, MacMillian & Co. 1892) (discussing the nuanced difference between
decimation and special tithes); Whitehead, supra note 41, at 529–30; Geo Widengren, The
Status of the Jews in the Sasasian Empire, 1 IRANICA ANTIQUA 117, 149–53 (1961).
46. Trs. of the First Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181, 192–93
(1886), rev’d on other grounds, City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 13 S.E. 252
(Ga. 1891).
47. See PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (1888); Henry W.
Foote, The Taxation of Churches, in 7 UNITARIAN REVIEW AND RELIGIOUS MAGAZINE 349,
469-71 (Boston, 1877) (bound volume of magazine issues).
48. See, e.g., Warde v. City of Manchester, 56 N.H. 508 (1876).
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that could not endure” without such ideals.49 Similarly, there has also been
much give-and-take regarding the exemption itself, as charities have
struggled with state entities over time, always seeking lower tax burdens
with varying levels of success.50
49. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 76 Ga. at 192–93, rev’d on other grounds, First
Presbyterian Church, 13 S.E. 252; see also A.T. Bledsoe, Taxation of Church Property,
SOUTHERN REV., July 1876, at 169, 174 (“It is upon this principle . . . that church property
has heretofore been exempted from taxation, viz. that the exemption was worth more to the
State than the taxation. Churches are not built for purposes of gain . . . . [T]he church is built
for the benefit of the public . . . .”); SCHAFF, supra note 47, at 19–20; Foote, supra note 47, at
469-71. Justice Brennan nicely encapsulated both of these arguments in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York, when he wrote, about churches:
First, these organizations are exempted because they, among a range of other
private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the community
in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that would
otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the
detriment of the community.
....
Second, government grants exemptions to religious organizations because
they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by their religious
activities. Government may properly include religious institutions among the
variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to
a vigorous, pluralistic society.
397 U.S. 664, 687–89 (1970) (citing Wash. Ethical Soc’y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d
127, 129 (1957); New York Constitutional Convention: Report of the Committee on
Taxation doc. no. 2, at 2 (1938)). And, to be fair, this broad-based view of the utility of
religion is reflected within the relevant statutes and regulations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) includes
“religious purposes” among its exempt endeavors, and Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iv)
defines “charitable” as including, among other things, “advancement of religion.” Arguably,
then, anything a church does is contemplated by the relevant tax provisions; any business or
investment activity that redounds to a church’s benefit could be described as advancing the
relevant religion or church. But that seems disingenuous and wholly at odds with the
publicly accepted purpose of providing tax subsidies to churches, which purpose (as
expounded by churches themselves) ties directly to the concept of direct charity. Part III,
infra, expounds upon this discrepancy, arguing that churches are uniquely susceptible to a
kind of mission creep that ultimately pushes their activities outside anything close to the core
charitable purposes that most people associate with organized religion.
50. A variety of Christian kings, for instance, imposed heavy taxes on the Catholic
Church over the years. See J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII, at 241–304 (1970) (on the
Henrician Reformation); see also id. at 536–42 (bibliography referencing secondary sources
on the economic aspect of this reformation). Similarly, to finance their secular war in 1294,
Philip IV and Edward I imposed a tax on the “property and personnel of the Church.” 4
WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE AGE OF FAITH 812–13 (1950). Similarly, in
England, Henry VIII—knowing that the Church had approximately three times the land and
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Whatever the history and vagaries of secular-religious conflict, a
defensible consensus emerges that the United States affords tax subsidies to
churches and other charities because these entities provide charitable
services that “would otherwise be imposed upon the public . . . by general
taxation.”51 This is why the American taxpayer makes such a substantial,
explicit investment in charity through its untold billions of dollars in tax

wealth as the Crown—renounced taxation and confiscated the majority of the Church’s
property. ALFRED BALK, THE FREE LIST: PROPERTY WITHOUT TAXES 21 (Russell Sage
Found. 1971).
51. YMCA v. Douglas Cty., 83 N.W. 924, 926 (1900); see also Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983) (“Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought
beneficial to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are
deeply rooted in our history, as in that of England.”); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S.
578, 581 (1924) (“Evidently the [charitable] exemption is made in recognition of the benefit
which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and is intended to aid
them when not conducted for private gain.”); Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 216 A.2d
897, 907-09 (Md. 1966) (citing a list of tax exemption arguments), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
816 (1966); see also H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) (Revenue Act of 1938)
(“[E]xemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes
is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its
relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from
public funds.”); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies,
56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1351-52 (2015) (“According to this ‘economic subsidy theory,’
subsidizing charities helps them to provide public goods that would otherwise be underproduced.”); id. at 1349-51 (noting that §§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) are “widely considered to be
subsidies for favored social policies,” a concept known as “tax expenditure analysis”); Reka
Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes:
Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71 (1991); John Montague, The Law and
Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO
L. REV. 203, 259 (2013) (“[B]ecause churches are subsidized by taxpayer money, the
public . . . has a right to know what happens to it.”). That said, there is no explicit
requirement that “a church or predominantly religious organization must relieve a burden of
government in order to qualify as a charitable institution . . . since . . . government is not in
the business of religion.” Christian Reformed Church v. City of Grand Rapids, 303 N.W.2d
913, 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). And, as discussed above, there are other arguments
regarding the exemption of churches—but a reason does not have to be exclusive to be
significant. See Spiegel, supra note 36, at 1697 (“Tax exemption is a subsidy that society
confers on certain nonprofit organizations.”); see also, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
316, 347 (1819) (“A right to tax, is a right to destroy.”); ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 38, at
720 (reviewing the constitutional ability of the State to tax churches); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY,
TAXING THE CHURCH 113-56 (2017) (chapter 5, “Untangling Entanglement”) (arguing that
taxation of churches risks undue entanglement sufficient to justify church exemption in a
variety of settings).
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subsidies, and this is the reasoning behind the structure that emerges in the
IRC.52 Unfortunately, that structure permits misuse and opacity.
B. A System Built for Abuse
When it comes to churches, there is a critical lack of transparency and
clarity built into the IRC, the regulations, and court decisions surrounding
and implanting it. This results in a system that is effectively built for
systemic abuse.
To begin, there is no comprehensive legal definition of “church.”53 This
permits a variety of organizations to benefit from exempt status while
engaging in a wide array of activities divorced from anything like the
charitable activities that supposedly justify the tax subsidies afforded to
churches. The Supreme Court has spoken on this issue several times in
different contexts, but it has never articulated a concrete, usable formula. 54
Instead, the Court has developed an evolved view of belief, starting with a
focus on “the Creator” and eventually settling on “deeply and sincerely
[held] beliefs.”55 Ineluctably, this broad-based view of religion means that
52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2017) (listing as charitable ends “[r]elief of
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of
education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works;
lessening of the burdens of Government”).
53. See, e.g., Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate – Never the
Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 76 (2004).
54. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Hernandez v. Comm’r,
490 U.S. 680 (1989); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S.
378 (1990).
55. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). The Court’s first attempt can be
seen in Reynolds v. United States, where the majority candidly admitted that “the word
‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution.” 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). Twelve years later, in
Davis v. Beason, the Court asserted a theistic notion of religion as being inseparable from a
Creator. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The
Court wrote that “[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of
obedience to his will.” Id. at 342. That view held sway for a time, even though the Supreme
Court made it clear that the theological implications of a given religion are not to be
individually assessed. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“The religious
views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people.
But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.”). Even that
standard, however, proved too stringent, as the Court eventually moved to focus simply on
one’s conscience. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340 (holding that “[i]f an individual deeply and
sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content, but that
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience . . . those beliefs certainly occupy in the
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any organization can claim the status of a “church” in the overarching legal
tradition of American law.
While there may be historical and cultural reasons for such an approach,
the attitude has unavoidably extended to the IRC, to the cases interpreting
and applying it, and to the special treatment afforded a “church” under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).56 There is no actual definition of “church” in the IRC, so
courts have often been called upon to determine what qualifies as a church
or religion. The judiciary’s broad and accepting view of religion in other
contexts, favoring inclusiveness over analytical heft, has routinely carried
the day here as well. In De La Salle v. United States, for instance, the court
stated that:

life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious
persons”) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)); Tarasco v. Walsh,
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (stating that “[n]either [federal nor state governments] can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs”).
56. There is a distinction between a “religious organization” and a “church” in that
religious organizations may or may not receive tax-exempt status. In order to qualify as
exempt, an organization must serve an exclusively exempt purpose. See Treas. Reg.
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2017). For example, the IRS has qualified a religious broadcasting
station as a “religious organization” and granted it tax-exemption status under 501(c)(3)
because it exclusively devoted broadcasting time to worship and other religious content
without selling commercial or advertising time. See Rev. Rul. 78–385, 1978–2 C.B. 174;
Rev. Rul. 68–563, 1968–2 C.B. 212. On the other hand, the Tax Court once held a
purportedly religious book publisher non-exempt because it did not advance a religion and
was simply a money making operation. Found. for Divine Meditation v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 411 (1965), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Parker v. Comm’r, 305 F.2d 792
(8th Cir. 1966). Ultimately, both categories—religious organizations and churches—are
subject to a very lax, “hands off” approach in most circumstances. See Kent Greenawalt,
Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“The Supreme Court's basic constitutional approach . . . is that
secular courts must not determine questions of religious doctrine and practice.”); Samuel J.
Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious
Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 85 (1997) (“In recent years, the United
States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters
that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief.”). This Article focuses on
churches (and the integrated auxiliaries that are lumped with them for tax purposes), which
do not have to apply for recognition of their tax-exempt status and do not have to file any
annual filings. See, e.g., Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 1366. Distinctions between different
kinds of religious organizations do not, however, ultimately affect the underlying problems
or proposed solutions discussed in this Article.
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[t]he term ‘church’ includes a religious order or a religious
organization . . . if its duties include the ministration of sacerdotal
functions and the conduct of religious worship. If . . . not . . . it is
subject to the tax imposed . . . whether or not it engages in
religious, educational, or charitable activities. . . . If a religious
order or organization can fully meet the requirements . . .
exemption . . . will apply to all its activities . . . . 57
Building on this confusing articulation, the Tax Court later indicated that
Congress intended the word church to be used in the “denomination” sense,
not “in a generic or universal sense.”58 It then proceeded to articulate three
varying definitions of the term stated:
We think that . . . the concept of “church” appears to be
synonymous with the concept of “denomination” . . . or “sect”
rather than to be used in any universal sense. This is not to
imply, however, that in order to be constituted a church, a group
must have an organizational hierarchy or maintain church
buildings.59
Judge Dawson, in a concurring opinion stated that, “[t]o be a ‘church’ a
religious organization must engage in ‘the ministration of sacerdotal
functions and the conduct of religious worship’ in accordance with ‘the
tenets and practices of a particular religious body.’”60 Judge Tannenwald
wrote a second concurring opinion, giving rise to what has become known
as the “associational test.”61 Essentially, he emphasized the importance of a
congregational element when deciding whether an organization is a church:
In my opinion, the word “church” implies that an otherwise
qualified organization bring people together as the principal
means of accomplishing its purpose. The objects of such
gatherings need not be conversion to a particular faith or
segment of a faith nor the propagation of the views of a
particular denomination or sect. The permissible purpose may be
accomplished individually and privately in the sense that oral
manifestation is not necessary, but it may not be accomplished in

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

195 F. Supp. 891, 900–01 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (emphasis added).
Chapman v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 358, 363 (1967).
See id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 366–67 (Dawson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
See id. at 367-69 (Tannenwald, J., concurring opinion).
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physical solitude. A man may, of course, pray alone, but, in such
a case, though his house may be a castle, it is not a ‘church.’62
Perceiving the confusion inherent in these potentially incongruent
standards, the IRS developed its own list of fourteen criteria to evaluate
whether an organization qualifies as a “church.”63 These criteria include (1)
distinct legal existence, (2) recognized creed and form of worship, (3)
definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (4) formal code of doctrine
and discipline, (5) distinct religious history, (6) membership not associated
with any other church or denomination, (7) organization of ordained
ministers, (8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed
courses of study, (9) literature of its own, (10) established places of
worship, (11) regular congregations, (12) regular religious services, (13)
Sunday schools for the religious instruction of the young, and (14) schools
for the preparation of its members.64 Unfortunately, these criteria are
neither predictive nor controlling.65 But some guidance is better than none,
and the courts have relied on this list at times, frequently citing the “regular
congregation” as the most important factor.66
62. Id. at 367 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).
63. This list was made public in a 1978 speech given by IRS Commissioner Jerome
Kurtz. See IRS News Release, IR-1930 (1978); Jerome Kurtz, Comm’r, IRS, Remarks at the
PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax Planning (Jan. 9, 1978), reprinted in Fed. Taxes
(P–H) ¶ 54,820 (1978) [hereinafter Remarks at the PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax
Planning]; IRS PUB. NO. 1828, TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS, 501(C)(3): TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 33
(2015).
64. Remarks at the PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax Planning, supra note 63.
65. The IRS itself acknowledges that the list is merely a guide and that “few, if any,
religious organizations . . . could satisfy all of [the] criteria.” Id. The associational test
articulated by Judge Tannenwald essentially makes the “regular congregation” factor
(number 12, above) a controlling factor.
66. See, e.g., Am. Guidance Found. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 (D.D.C.
1980); Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1341, 1359 (1987). In
American Guidance Foundation, the court elaborated on Judge Tannenwald’s concurring
opinion in Chapman and explicitly created the associational test:
While some of [the 14 criteria] are relatively minor, others, e. g. the existence
of an established congregation served by an organized ministry, the provision
of regular religious services and religious education for the young, and the
dissemination of a doctrinal code, are of central importance. The means by
which an avowedly religious purpose is accomplished separates a “church”
from other forms of religious enterprise. . . . At a minimum, a church includes a
body of believers or communicants that assembles regularly in order to
worship. Unless the organization is reasonably available to the public in its
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That said, the system is no closer to effectively policing tax issues and
potential abuse of exemption laws by churches. The main reason for this
problem is that, even with some IRS guidance, the U.S. government has
steadfastly maintained a reluctance to policing this issue, and courts have
never settled on a single, controlling standard.67 “[W]e disavow any
intimations in this case defining or limiting what constitutes a church
under . . . any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.”68
More importantly, the IRS seemingly does not bother with its own
patina-of-a-test; the agency instead permits individual organizations to
decide whether they constitute a “church” and refuses to police those
decisions.69 Typically, an organization claiming to meet the requirements of

conduct of worship, its educational instruction, and its promulgation of
doctrine, it cannot fulfill this associational role.
Id. at 306 (citing Chapman, 48 T.C. at 367). A year later, in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. South Dakota, the Supreme Court cemented the importance of this test, stating
that “[t]he word ‘church’ . . . must be construed, instead, to refer to the congregation.” 451
U.S. 772, 784 (1981).
67. See Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 1367–69.
68. St. Martin Evangelical, 451 U.S. at 784 n.15. All the “test” really requires, then, is
some regular assembly of individuals related by faith. See Riker v. Comm’r, 244 F.2d 220
(9th Cir. 1957); Chapman v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 358 (1967); Am. Guidance Found., 490 F.
Supp. at 304; De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The
definition of such assembly, or congregation, is itself extremely generous; indeed, even a
group of two or three people may qualify. See, e.g., Church of Eternal Life, 86 T.C. 916,
924–25 (1986) (noting that “incipient churches may have only two or three gathered
together”). Even an aspirational church would likely grow beyond that, given its
“associational role,” but such growth is not necessarily required. The naked requirement
remains very, very bare. See id.; see also Found. of Human Understanding v. United States,
614 F.3d 1383, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he associational test does not demand that
religious gatherings be held with a particular frequency or on a particular schedule . . . .”);
Purnell v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3037 (1992) (holding that The Kingdom of God
Headquarters Church qualified as a church because the organization had a place of worship;
regular congregations; regular religious services; and their own, religious creed, literature,
and doctrine).
69. See, e.g., Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Why the IRS Has Stopped Auditing Churches –
Even One that Calls President Obama a Muslim, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/october-web-only/why-irs-has-stopped-auditingchurches-even-one-that-calls-p.html; see also Philip T. Hackney, Charitable Organization
Oversight: Rules v. Standards, 13 PITT. TAX REV. 83, 98–99 (2015) (“In most years the IRS
audits less than one percent of the existing charitable organization population.”). This is at
least partially due to the fact that churches do not have to file any return and are simply
assumed exempt. See, e.g., ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 39, at 743 (citing I.R.C. § 508(a),
(b) (2012)).
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§ 501(c)(3) must file an application for approval by the IRS. 70 But this
requirement is puzzlingly dropped for churches.71 Churches simply need
not file an application for exemption under § 501(c)(3).72 Bookending this
kid-glove treatment of qualification issues, churches can only be audited in
rare circumstances, and, when they are, they are afforded extraordinary
protections.73

70. See JODY BLAZEK, TAX PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE FOR TAX EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (5th ed. Supp. 2016).
71. But see ZELINSKY, supra note 51, at 113-56 (arguing that taxation of churches risks
undue entanglement). This is an adequate response to the frustrations expressed herein. If
one posits that the government should never pressure churches in any manner, then that is
effectively the end of the argument. This Article rests on an implicit assumption that
churches, like every other entity, can be taxed without being destroyed or impermissibly
directed by governmental authorities. That assumption appears to be well-grounded in the
current law as churches are taxed, albeit at reduced rates or in inconsistent ways. See supra
note 39. A broader discussion of that assumption is beyond the scope of this Article.
72. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1828: TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2015). Nevertheless, many churches still apply primarily because without
an IRS letter that recognizes exemption under 501(c)(3), tax-exemption status is only a
rebuttable presumption. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND TAX
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 116 (2d. ed. 2012).
73. See I.R.C. § 7611 (2012). This section is explicitly intended to protect churches
from the IRS.
Section 7611's purpose is to “minimize IRS contacts with churches to only
those necessary to insure compliance with the tax laws.” To begin an inquiry
into a possible section 501(c)(3) violation by a church, “an appropriate highlevel Treasury official [must] reasonably believe[] (on the basis of facts and
circumstances recorded in writing) that the church . . . may not be exempt . . . .”
The Service must send notice of the inquiry in writing and must include “the
concerns which gave rise to such inquiry.” Churches must also be given the
opportunity to have a conference with appropriate members of the Service's
investigation team in advance of the investigation.
Once the initial inquiry becomes a formal investigation, section 7611
presumptively protects church records, restricting review of the records only to
the extent necessary. This restriction imposes a higher burden on the Service to
demonstrate necessity. To show that requested documents are necessary, the
Service must “(1) show that the purposes of the investigation are proper, and
(2) explain how the particular documents, or categories of documents, (a) fall
directly and logically within the scope of those purposes and (b) will help
significantly to further an investigation within the scope of those purposes.”
The law also imposes a two year limit on the total time for investigation.
Leslie S. Garthwaite, An End to Politically Motivated Audits of Churches-How Amendment
to Section 7217 Can Preserve Integrity in the Tax Investigation of Churches Under Section
7611, 60 TAX LAW. 503, 509 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
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Because organizations can easily qualify for church status, and neither
the IRS nor any other government agency is interested in reviewing that
qualification, the IRS is handcuffed when it comes to approaching such an
entity in any fashion.74 The lack of transparency and accountability is even
deeper: any entity that “qualifies” as a “church” is granted the protection of
near total secrecy, even from the IRS.
Charitable organizations are generally required to file Form 990, the
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, which lays out a taxexempt organization’s gross income, receipts, and disbursements.75 The IRS
views this form as the “primary tax compliance tool for tax-exempt
organizations.”76 This is intuitive—that which is not monitored cannot be
policed. However, this filing requirement is simply dropped when it comes
to “churches.”77 As such, nobody has the ability to track the expenditures of
churches to determine whether they are pursuing or furthering “charitable”
ends. There is no existing justification for this intentional and extraordinary
lack of oversight.78
In the end, the result is a carefully constructed sheath of
unaccountability, ensuring that purported religious organizations are
afforded an extraordinarily robust tax status that allows churches to raise
and spend funds without public accountability.79 This system means that the
74. See, e.g., Mathew Encino, Holy Profits: How Federal Law Allows for the Abuse of
the Church Tax-Exempt Status, 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 78, 85–86 (2014) (explaining that
churches are exempt from filing Form 1023, the application for 501(c)(3) status).
75. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 109. Private Foundations are required to file
Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable
Trust Treated as a Private Foundation. This requirement was first imposed in the Revenue
Act of 1943. See Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 117(a), 58 Stat. 21, 36–37 (1944).
76. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BACKGROUND PAPER, SUMMARY OF FORM 990 REDESIGN
PROCESS 1 (2008), http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/summary_form_990_redesign_
process.pdf.
77. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 11283J, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 3 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/i990.pdf (exempting churches and certain church-affiliated organizations from filing).
Also exempted from filling out a “full” Form 990 are certain organizations with relatively
smaller revenues and/or fewer assets. Id. at 4 (indicating that such organizations can fill out
the less onerous 990-EZ or 990-N forms).
78. Montague, supra note 51, at 230–31 (noting that the exemption from disclosure was
not initially imposed because Congress was not concerned about churches competing with
private business, a concern that only later came to the fore).
79. The disclosure requirement has changed somewhat over the years. As presently
constituted, it exempts “churches” and “integrated auxiliaries” from filing, but it does not
exempt “religious organizations.” Samuel D. Brunson, The Present, Past, and Future of LDS
Financial Transparency, DIALOGUE: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 2015, at 7.
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government has no consistent, documented proof as to the size of the tax
subsidy afforded to churches or whether that public investment is paying
off.80 The result of this lack of transparency and accountability is precisely
what one would guess: there is substantial evidence that the amount of
money being funneled to ostensible churches is enormous and that it is not
being used in a traditionally charitable manner.
Again, the LDS Church serves as a helpful example. According to the
church itself, it gave approximately $1.3 billion in humanitarian aid
between 1985 and 2010.81 That is little, however, compared to the funds it
raised during that time. Recall that the church likely generates somewhere
around $8 billion per year in tithing, and reasonable estimates suggest that
the church raised more than $100 billion between 1985 and 2010.82 That
means that the church gave less than 2% of its incoming funds to charity.83

“An ‘integrated auxiliary’ is a tax-exempt organization that is affiliated with a church, but
does not offer goods or services to the general public.” Id. at 7 n.28 (citing Treas. Reg.
§1.6033-2(h)(1)(2011)). This obviously broadens exemption from disclosure and was
apparently included in current law at the instance of Senator Wallace F. Bennett of Utah in
order to protect a variety of LDS Church entities from disclosure requirements. See id.
80. There are some limitations on this lax oversight of religious spending and
investment. Part III, infra, explains a number of these limitations in its discussion of private
foundation spending rules and the UBIT and how those concepts should inform future
policymakers’ approaches to the taxation of churches.
81. Winter et al., Money Behind the Mormon Message, supra note 13.
82. Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4. But see Kaimi Wenger,
Business Week’s Erroneous Claim About LDS Charitable Giving, TIMES & SEASONS (July
11, 2012), http://www.timesandseasons.org/harchive/2012/07/business-weeks-erroneousclaim-about-lds-charitable-giving/.
83. Again, to be fair, see supra note 49, discussing the potentially fluid definition of
“charity.” To the extent one focuses on material aid to the needy, and underscoring the
paucity of the numbers discussed in the text, only one-third of that amount was actually
monetary assistance, and the $100 billion figure does not include other sources of revenue or
income. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16; Winter, How the Mormons Make Money,
supra note 4. Indeed, even this assessment might be overly generous, as some estimates
indicate the church donates less than 1% of its annual income to charity. Wenger, supra note
82 (citing Professor Ryan T. Cragun for the proposition that the church gives only 0.7% to
charity). This kind of giving is marked but sees some parallels in other churches. See infra
notes 83-84 and accompanying text. It also compares unfavorably even to the worst nonchurch charities. See, e.g., Kris Hundley & Kendall Taggard, America’s 50 Worst Charities
Rake in Nearly $1 Billion Dollars for Corporate Fundraisers, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 2,
2017, 4:10 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/americas-50-worst-charities-rakein-nearly-1-billion-for-corporate/2339540 (indicating that these charities collectively paid
out less than 4% of their donations in direct cash aid).
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Though a striking example, the LDS Church is certainly not alone. For
instance, the United Methodist Church is believed to have spent “about 29
percent of its revenues [on] charitable causes in 2010 (about $62 million of
$214 million received).”84 Similarly, some estimates indicate that annual
spending by the American division of the Catholic Church was $170 billion
in 2010 and that just 2.7% went directly toward national charitable
activities.85 Indeed, examples are legion, and this appears to be a
widespread issue (as one would expect given the tax-induced economic
incentives outlined herein).86 Recognizing this problem, Senator Chuck
Grassley sent letters to leaders of six large churches in 2007, asking them to
disclose the kind of information that Form 990 would typically reveal. 87
According to the Senator, this number could have been higher—he chose
these churches based on media reports regarding luxury purchases like
corporate jets and $23,000 commodes.88 A recent survey found that there
were 1210 megachurches in the United States in 2005, nearly double the
number from five years earlier, and a follow-up survey found that the
average 2008 income of such churches was $6.5 million, only a quarter of
which went to missions and programs.89
84. Cragun et al., supra note 40, at 40 (citing United Methodist Church Gen. Council of
Fin. And Admin., Financial Commitment Report (Dec. 2010)).
85. See Earthly Concerns, supra note 20 (reviewing bankruptcy diocesan bankruptcy
filings). However, it is notable that this number does not include amounts that went to
hospitals and schools, functions that likely fit within the general scope of charitable activities
that the government would otherwise have to pay for. See id. The Catholic Church is a
history-spanning entity with enormous spiritual, social, cultural, and political impact. It is
difficult to analyze its impact in this Article given its size, global manifestation, and the
millennia of secrecy surrounding its economic and political dealings. See generally GERALD
POSNER, GOD’S BANKERS: A HISTORY OF MONEY AND POWER AT THE VATICAN (2015).
86. See, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 218-20 (discussing numerous financial
scandals involving churches).
87. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-Based Ministries, U.S.
SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Nov. 6, 2007), https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-membersnews/grassley-seeks-information-from-six-media-based-ministries.
88. Laurie Goodstein, Senator Questioning Ministries on Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/us/07ministers.html. Only two of the churches
responded timely. Two responded late and only partially—one simply never responded. Id.
For even more extreme examples of bad acts relating to taxation issues, see Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381, 505 (1984) (finding that “in the pursuit of
[conspiring to impede the IRS, the church] filed false tax returns, burglarized IRS offices,
stole IRS documents, and harassed, delayed, and obstructed IRS agents who tried to audit
Church records”).
89. Scott Thumma et al., Megachurches Today 2005: Summary of Research Findings,
HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGIOUS RES. (2005), http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/
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Though extreme, these kinds of purchases and this sort of behavior is
merely representative of how little many churches spend on actual charity.
“One calculation of the resources expended by 271 U.S. congregations
found that, on average, ‘operating expenses’ totaled 71 percent of all the
expenditures of religions, much of that going to pay ministers’ salaries.”90
Again, this statistic compares unfavorably with a number of other, nonchurch charities.91 If nothing else, it brings into doubt the concept that
churches are particularly effective channels for charitable giving and that
they should be treated differently from any other § 501(c)(3) organization.
It bears repeating that the subsidies involved in this issue are huge.
Though it is not possible to assign concrete numbers because churches are
not required to file annual forms with the IRS or to otherwise disclose their
finances, some calculations are possible. Assuming that most organized
religions would be taxed at the maximum federal corporate tax rate (based
on revenue), the annual federal income tax subsidy is approximately $35
billion and the annual state income tax subsidy is about $6 billion per
year.92 Additionally, churches pay little or no property tax on explicitly
religious property (such as churches and temples) and a reduced rate on
many other kinds of property.93 This amounts to an additional subsidy of
more than $25 billion per year.94 On top of these exemptions, religions pay
little or reduced capital gains tax; religious functionaries can opt out of selfemployment taxes; and ministers benefit from the “parsonage exemption,”
which permits churches to pay the cost of their living arrangements without

megastoday2005_summaryreport.html; Scott Thumma & Warren Bird, Changes in
American Megachurches: Tracing Eight Years of Growth and Innovation in the Nation’s
Largest-Attendance Congregations, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGIOUS RES. (2008),
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday2008_summaryreport.html.
90. Cragun et al., supra note 40, at 40 (citing CHRISTIAN SMITH ET AL., PASSING THE
PLATE: WHY AMERICAN CHRISTIANS DON’T GIVE AWAY MORE MONEY (2008)). This sort of
accounting is particularly galling when compared to explicitly for-profit companies that give
away vastly more to charity than many churches. Id. (pointing out that Wal-Mart gives
approximately “$1.75 billion in food aid to charities each year, or twenty-eight times all of
the money allotted for charity by the United Methodist Church and almost double what the
LDS Church has given in the last twenty-five years”).
91. Id. (noting that the American Red Cross spends 92.1% of its revenue on the physical
needs of those it aims to help—an amount that is 130 times higher than the comparable
spend rate of the LDS Church).
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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taxation.95 In sum, these subsidies conservatively amount to over $71
billion per year in exemptions.96
In the end, the Code is not functioning as intended, as massive amounts
of money escape government taxation but do not flow to charity. But the
problem does not end there.
II. Even the Right Thing Gets Crooked97
Aside from the enormous, ineffectual expense of subsidizing organized
religion, another reason to question the exemptions afforded to churches is
that these tax-free funds, when left unaudited and unchecked, flood the
economy and fundamentally distort free markets.98 The idea is
straightforward but subtle: every market actor (whether or not ostensibly for
profit) undertakes a return-on-investment analysis to assess economic
options, which inherently assesses its effective, after-tax rate of return. Of
course, that analysis is simpler for entities like churches that do not, in fact,
pay taxes. Given that these organizations are permitted to funnel tens of
billions of untaxed dollars into the economy, they can engage in a
quantitatively different kind of analysis, which ultimately affects their
positioning in a competitive market environment and the economic options
available to every other actor therein.
A. Return on Investment
Any entity contemplating any expenditure or investment must undertake
a return-on-investment analysis to determine whether the outlay is
justified.99 The general idea is straightforward: decision-makers must
decide whether a given investment will generate enough money to justify

95. Id. at 43; Frances E. McNair & Nina S. Collum, Tax Planning to Take Advantage of
Unique Benefits for Clergy, 24 J. TAX’N INV. 238 (2007) (“[F]or ministers of the gospel,
gross income does not include a housing allowance paid as part of the compensation to the
extent that the allowance is used to rent or provide a home and to the extent that the
allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home . . . .”).
96. Cragun et al., supra note 40, at 44.
97. St. Arsenie Boca.
98. See What Is “Market Distortion”, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
terms/m/marketdistortion.asp#ixzz5Suzxlbqf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (“[A]lmost all types
of taxes and subsidies . . . can cause a market distortion.”).
99. See Joe Knight, The Most Common Mistake People Make in Calculating ROI,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 9, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/04/the-most-common-mistake-peoplemake-in-calculating-roi. Non-controversially, the goal is to return a profit, while pricing in
the risk of the proposition.
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the risk associated with that investment.100 There is, of course, a
relationship between return on investment and risk such that riskier
undertakings require a higher rate of return to compensate for the higher
likelihood of loss.101 Intuitively, this means that riskier investments must
yield higher rates of return or the market will favor less risky, more stable
investment options. Of course, each entity has an internal “benchmark” rate
of return driven by a host of factors below which it will not invest.102 One
of those factors critical to this discussion is the cost of capital to the entity
(which depends on the tax applied to investors).103 Before delving into that
issue, it is important to understand the wide applicability of the rate-ofreturn analysis; it affects churches in precisely the same way as every other
kind of investing entity.
Initially, it may be tempting to view all kinds of financial analyses—
including rate of return models—as solely the province of traditional profitseeking entities. Indeed, it is easier to understand this kind of inquiry in a
traditional context, such as that of a traditional corporation. Such an entity
is, after all, a collection of individual economic interests and therefore must
continually monitor the return on investment it is generating for its
constituent stakeholders (who must be able to continually monitor whether
to continue investing in the organization). A simple example suffices to
demonstrate. Let us assume a corporation—which we will call X Corp.—is
faced with the decision of whether to invest $5 million into a residential
housing development. To make that decision, X Corp. must decide what
sort of return that investment will yield and determine whether such a return
is sufficient for its investors.104 Shareholder B, for example, will withdraw
her money from X Corp. and move it elsewhere if X Corp. cannot generate a
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the
Surviving Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and
Suggestions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 941, 963 n.93 (1992) (“[R]eturn on investment is related to
risk . . . .”).
102. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 126 (2002) (describing how a hypothetical taking would attempt to mimic
the internal benchmark of the regulated company to ensure fairness).
103. Knight, supra note 99; see also Michael T. Jacobs & Anil Shivdasani, Do You Know
Your Cost of Capital?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July-Aug. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/07/do-youknow-your-cost-of-capital.
104. See, e.g., Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of
Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 531 n.150 (2004) (“[Equity capital markets] are the
vehicle by which shareholders bargain over the terms of their equity investment contract
with the corporation.”).
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sufficient return on Shareholder B’s invested funds.105 X Corp., then, is
continually assessing its investment options in terms of whether it can
generate the kinds of returns that Shareholder B and its other investors
demand. The situation is a good deal more complex-corporations and waves
of individual investors continually evaluate investment opportunities and
strategies. But the overarching principle is straightforward: if a corporation
does not adequately evaluate its options and generate an adequate return for
its investors, those investors will move elsewhere.
That is a relatively easy-to-understand narrative given the ubiquity of
corporate (or other collective) investment in the modern economy.
However—and most importantly—that kind of investment analysis is not
limited to traditional companies or corporate collectives. In fact, this returnon-investment analysis is necessary for every person or entity that invests.
This includes individuals, churches, and every other kind of investor,
regardless of whether they have constituent owners or stakeholders.
Admittedly, it seems odd to conceptualize a church engaging in the kind
of return-based analysis described above given that churches do not really
have to consider whether they are able to generate an actual return. But this
is irrelevant. What is key is that every rational market actor has to analyze
the opportunity costs of any investment and so engage in a return-oninvestment analysis. There is simply no other way to determine what
investments to make. Put differently, any person or entity pursuing marketbased returns has to evaluate which activities generate higher returns.106
That is, even though a church has no analogue to Shareholder B, it still has
to decide what to invest in so that it can maximize its own resources. Every
time a church is faced with a market-facing investment or expense, it has to
decide whether to proceed or turn elsewhere. Deciding what to invest in
means comparing investment opportunities, which requires assigning return
metrics to them and deciding which are superior.
105. In other words, X Corp. must overcome Z’s opportunity costs of investing with X
Corp.—that is, the return Z could generate elsewhere. Opportunity costs can include nonmonetary returns, such as the positive feelings generated by investing in an environmentally
friendly corporation, but this is beyond the scope of this Article.
106. You could invest randomly or only in certain companies or opportunities that match
extrinsic criteria (e.g., companies that do not produce carbon or real estate investment trusts
that focus on rebuilding inner-city areas), but doing so necessarily means that you are not
investing to maximize market returns, which is contrary to basic economic assumptions. See,
e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75
VA. L. REV. 605, 616 (1989) (“[N]onprofit firms that own unrelated businesses presumably
have much the same kind of interest in those firms that any other owner would have—
namely, to maximize the financial return they yield.”).
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Assume, then, that Church X is now the entity faced with deciding
whether to invest $5 million in a residential housing development. Just like
X Corp., it will have to decide whether the investment is “worth it” because,
just like X Corp., it will have to determine the amount of money it will
recover in proceeds. There are many ways to conduct this analysis, but it
must be done in some fashion, because all rational, profit-seeking actors
seek to understand and maximize their return and cannot do so unless they
evaluate the different kinds of returns available to them. Simply put, as a
matter of basic economic necessity, every church that acts in an
economically rational manner will analyze its potential return—the
alternative is ineffectiveness.107
That is not to say, however, that there is no difference between the
market impact of a corporation and a church. Indeed, the tax exemption
embedded in all such analyses undertaken by churches, as opposed to
traditional for-profit corporations, ends up creating significant, and
historically underappreciated, distortions. These distortions effectively
permit churches to undercut other market actors to the detriment of the
entire economy.
B. Economic Distortions
When a corporation evaluates the return on investment required by its
shareholders, it must do so in contemplation of the taxes those shareholders
will pay.108 This may or may not be explicit, but investors evaluate their
investments in terms of what will ultimately come to them, which
necessarily involves tax calculations.109
Let us again consider X Corp. and Shareholder B. X Corp. must evaluate
whether to invest its $5 million on behalf of Shareholder B in the residential
107. The only substantial difference, as noted above, is that the church will undertake the
analysis for itself rather than on behalf of any shareholder or investor. In fact, a church will
have a more direct, less complicated analysis than a traditional corporation because the
church does not have to consider the return it is generating for someone else (and,
concomitantly, whether that return is sufficient to ensure ongoing, or future, investment).
108. See Johgho Kim, Bankruptcy Law Dilemma: Appraisal of Corporate Value and Its
Distribution in Corporate Reorganization Proceedings, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 119, 161
n.225 (2009) (“The cost of capital is used by shareholders to see if the corporation is
delivering a sufficient return, bearing in mind the risks of the business. It is the
compensation that corporations must provide investors in return for the use of their
capital.”). From the shareholder’s perspective, that compensation will be post-tax.
109. See Jacobs & Shivdasani, supra note 103 (“{W]hether a company uses its marginal
or effective tax rates in computing its cost of debt will greatly affect the outcome of its
investment decisions.”).
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housing development or some investment alternative. Very simply, this
means that X Corp. must decide whether the investment will generate a
sufficient return to Shareholder B.110 Assume that the analysis reveals that
the investment will return $500,000 per year (or, seemingly, a 10% return
per year). The question ultimately is whether that $500,000 is “enough” to
entice Shareholder B to invest in, and keep her capital in, X Corp.
Here is where taxes come into play. Although Shareholder B is
demanding a particular return, her demand has her individual tax structure
built into it. She does not have the benefit of receiving her funds tax-free
and proceeding to invest from there. Instead, her return must be sufficient to
justify the investment she makes of her already-taxed funds. Shareholder B,
in evaluating whether a $500,000 return is sufficient, will view it not as a
return on $500,000 but as a return on the money that she had to earn in
order to generate $500,000 of investable capital. Shareholder B is granted
no special exemption like the Church and so has to pay taxes on her
income. Assume that her effective rate is 20%.111 That means she actually
had to earn $6,250,000 in order to invest $5,000,000 into X Corp. As such,
the real return-on-investment calculation—made by X Corp. on behalf of
Shareholder B—is whether a $500,000 return on a $6,250,000 investment is
sufficient. If Shareholder B (and the wider market she is representing in our
stripped-down example) has set a benchmark return of 10%, then X Corp.
will not be able to pursue the housing project and will have to look
elsewhere to achieve the kinds of returns demanded by Shareholder B.112
Now, a careful observer might ask why the housing development would
return only 10%. If X Corp.—as the embodiment of our hypothetical
Shareholder B and the aggregation of the wider market—is not willing to
invest in the housing development, is it not the case that the return on
investment will have to change? Of course, the nature of the investment
will not change, but the cost might. If the developer and marketer of the
development is asking $5,000,000, which effectively represents a return
110. This example strips out the overhead costs associated with running an investmentconcentrating entity, such as a corporation. It also presumes that net profits will be returned
to shareholders via direct distributions. In truth, a corporation is a complex entity,
constituting a cost center in and of itself, and shareholders can reap gains through means
other than direct distributions. That said, the fundamental concept behind entity aggregation
is that shareholders invest based upon the ability of the entity to generate and return profit.
111. All examples assume basic, uncomplicated ordinary rates for ease of calculation and
demonstration.
112. Effectively, then, X Corp. will have to either return $625,000 on Shareholder B’s
investment or negotiate down the price of the housing opportunity so that it can pursue both
that and another profit-returning endeavor.
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that falls below what the market is demanding, is it not the case that the
developer will have to lower his asking price? After all, if X Corp. (as the
vicarious embodiment of the market) will not pursue it, neither will any
other corporation.
The generic answer to the above question is “yes.” Yes, the hypothetical
developer will have to lower his asking price because, by definition, we
have stated that “the market” is not willing to pay $5,000,000.113 But this is
where market distortion comes into play.
We cannot answer “yes” because the tax code has split the “market” into
two distinct segments—tax-exempt entities and everyone else.114 In other
words, tax-exempt churches do not labor in the same post-tax world as
everyone else, vicariously evaluating returns on behalf of individuals who
are investing after-tax dollars.115
Return to the earlier example. Recall that Shareholder B requires a 10%
return on investment, and assume that a given church (which we will call
“Church A”) has the same benchmark.116 This means that X Corp. and
Church A, both on the hunt for investing opportunities, will evaluate every
opportunity that presents itself based on this seemingly similar requirement.
As we have seen, however, that seemingly similar requirement is anything
but—Church A only needs a $500,000 return on its $5,000,000 investment,
while X Corp. needs a $625,000 return on its $5,000,000 investment.
The difference may not seem significant, but ultimately, it means that
Church A will have an advantage in securing the “best,” or lowest-risk,

113. Again, this is a simplistic example. Different market actors have different
participants with different skill sets, different return requirements, and different perceptions
of market conditions. That said, there is, at some point, a basic equilibrium, which represents
the market and what it is willing to offer for a given opportunity. Here, the example
minimizes all associated issues into X Corp. and its need to satisfy Shareholder B.
114. Of course, there are many different reasons that markets are not efficient. See What
Is “Market Distortion,” supra note 98. This Article is focusing on only one. Also, it may
well be the case that this particular problem is a wider one that involves more than just
churches. The tax exemption afforded to a wide array of entities may, in fact, pull all nonprofit entities within the scope of the arguments presented herein. This Article, however,
focuses only on churches for the various reasons already discussed herein.
115. Such investable funds are either donated or are themselves a return earned on other
donated or invested funds (which were, themselves, donated). At their base, then, all such
capital is donated and received by churches on a tax-free basis.
116. This actually seems like a relatively uncontroversial supposition. Assuming perfect
markets with a general population of transient investors, all investors should theoretically
settle upon a stable rate of return.
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investment opportunities.117 Remember, in an efficient and equalized
market, X Corp. will not pursue the investment opportunity because it does
not provide the required level of return, but neither will anyone else. The
hypothetical developer would have to lower his asking price so that the
investment demanded will produce a return sufficient to provide
Shareholder B with a 10% return on her pre-tax capital. But, so long as
Church A can raise funds tax-free, the developer will not lower his asking
price. Church A will be able to offer the full $5,000,000 and acquire the
opportunity. Of course, Church A, perceiving that there are others in the
market who are pressuring the price downward, will attempt to secure a
lower price. If we assume that this opportunity is a desirable one, then
Church A will always have an advantage over X Corp. This ability to offer
more, as it recurs and saturates the market, will ineluctably put a distorting,
downward pressure on returns.118 Sellers will not be pressured to the same
117. “Best” is a pregnant term. Most easily conceptualized, it encompasses a reduced
level of risk. Of course, risk and return are intertwined, and it is beyond the scope of this
Article to disambiguate the two or otherwise discuss investment pricing. It suffices here to
posit that there are opportunities that are more desirable than others. It is also useful to point
out that this is not an entirely new concern, though the context raised herein is different from
that previously discussed. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 included provisions meant to
prevent a similar charitable advantage. See Sharpe, supra note 30, at 399–400 (“By
financing the purchase of business assets with tax-free earnings generated by those assets,
the exempt organization was placed in a unique position to pay a higher price than a taxable
investor could afford with after tax dollars.” (citing S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 62–63 (1969), as
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2091)). This Article argues that the basic unfairness—
easily seen in the context of a business owner selling his business to a non-profit in order to
exploit the buyer’s tax exemption—applies to every for-profit activity undertaken by exempt
entities utilizing their tax-exempted source of funds for all the reasons discussed herein.
118. Hansmann, supra note 106, at 611-12. A counter-argument is that, if this were so,
then these exempt entities with lower costs of capital would have already displaced
substantial parts of the market and that, because this has not happened, there must not be any
actual, undue advantage. Relatedly, there may be an argument that any advantage would not
lead to distortions because the advantaged entities would rationally participate in markets in
a way that either would not drive down competing returns or would result in a gradual
displacement that actually benefited profit-seeking businesses. See, e.g., id. at 609-12 (“In
this way, it was said, whole industries might ultimately be captured by nonprofits.”).
However, these are simplistic arguments that ultimately assume perfectly efficient actors. A
truly efficient and perfectly informed entity may well deploy the tax-based cost-of-capital
advantages identified here in either an all-consuming manner or a manner that does not
lower prices or returns. However, no entity—much less a church—is perfectly efficient or
informed. Cost of capital is merely one advantage. Non-tax-exempt entities will almost
certainly have one or more of a variety of potential advantages at their disposal relative to a
church: better management, better locations, superior goodwill, intellectual property, etc. As
such, one would expect a tax-exempt church to deploy its advantages in an attempt to offset
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extent they otherwise would be, meaning that overall market returns will be
depressed, affecting everyone.119
This gets to the heart of the Article: that market distortion flows from
unchecked exemption status.120 To be sure, this is not a very controversial
conclusion. In essence, all this Article is arguing is that when one market
participant is given access to cheaper capital it can underbid other market
participants, and such underbidding has a cascading effect on the returns
available in the marketplace.121 What is notable, though, is that this is
precisely the situation that the United States tax code has created. Because
of the secrecy afforded to churches by the IRC, these entities are free to
raise funds and devote them to for-profit endeavors. And because of the
tax-exempt nature of the capital raised, they do so at a competitive
advantage.122
Churches participate in the same economy as the rest of us, but they do
so with a built-in advantage. This tax advantage distorts the broader
economy and reduces the rates of return generally available in the

its relative disadvantages. In other words, it would maintain a position in the market
disproportionate to its economic standing despite its disadvantaged position, thus driving
prices lower than they should go. The market distortion that is the focus of this Article is
seen most clearly in the difference between a market with tax-advantaged players and a
market without them. Ours is an imperfect an inefficient economy. The fact that churches
have not entirely subsumed any identifiable market is, then, not surprising.
119. Of course, downward pressure on prices will harm sellers but help buyers. In this
sense, the market may be unaffected, on balance. However, any tax-induced distortion will
inflict some sort of inefficiency, whether it is introducing long-term investors (who do not
sell to others) to the market or inducing churches to pursue opportunities that they are
otherwise ill suited to exploit. The distortion is, by itself, problematic.
120. This concept has been identified by others but seems to have escaped a broader
review as the result, perhaps, of the impermanent tax-exempt status of the investing entity
itself. Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 260 (2012)
(“A tax-exempt entity can afford to pay a higher price because it can purchase assets with
untaxed money. . . . The ability of a tax-exempt entity to outbid taxable persons . . . derives
from the tax-exempt entity’s exemption from tax . . . .”).
121. It is worth pointing out that this is an enormous amount of capital. Figures are
available for as recently as 2011, when donors gave over $90 billion to religious
organizations. See Montague, supra note 51, at 206.
122. For another excellent example of the unfairness baked into our current system of
taxation that favors churches and other tax-exempt organizations, see Brunson, supra note
120, at 227 n.7 (noting that an IRS consultant in 2002 estimated the United States was losing
$70 billion every year in taxes from offshore tax evasion measures).
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market.123 And this is all the more galling because it is accomplished via a
tax subsidy. In the end, churches have convinced the American taxpayer to
handicap himself at his own expense.
III. There Is No New Thing Under the Sun124
There are two relatively straightforward solutions that, considered in
combination, would begin to remedy the systemic market distortions caused
by tax-exempt investment entities. Neither of these proposals is entirely
new—they come directly from the IRC, having been adopted in other
contexts in an effort to avoid the very difficulties already discussed.
First, and most simply, Congress should amend the IRC (and the
accompanying regulations and IRS processes and procedures) to require
churches to file Form 990.125 This requires no imagination, nor is it novel in
any way, yet it would have an enormous effect. It is apparent, when
reviewing the behavior of churches, that a substantial part of the reason that
they behave the way they do is because they can do so without
repercussion.126 “Everybody knows that corruption thrives in secret places,
123. This conclusion also mimics the long-standing complaint of those who argue that
churches have been permitted to distort the political realm for too long. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Fleet, Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 556–60 (1946) (arguing
that the ecclesiastical tax exemption must be ended to prevent churches from amassing vast
fortunes and unduly influencing the political realm); see also Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS,
It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L.
REV. 143 (2016). The argument also echoes an earlier one made by President Grant:
In 1850, I believe the church properties in the United States which paid no
taxes, municipal or State, amounted to about $83,000,000. In 1860 the amount
had doubled; in 1875 it is about $1,000,000,000. By 1900, without check, it is
safe to say this property will reach a sum exceeding $3,000,000,000. So vast a
sum, receiving all the protection and benefits of Government without bearing
its proportion of the burdens and expenses of the same, will not be looked upon
acquiescently by those who have to pay the taxes.
Ulysses S. Grant, State of the Union Message (Dec. 7, 1875), in 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1996, at 1296 (Fred. L. Israel ed., 1966).
124. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (King James).
125. Any iteration of Form 990 would suffice so long as the document requires a basic
disclosure of money raised and a categorized description of expenses and investments. This
is in contrast to other proposals, which would leave church-tax advantages in place but
substantially narrow the definition of “church.” See, e.g., Mishchenko, supra note 18, at
1369–80.
126. Indeed, this is reinforced even when comparing churches to other types of charities.
These other entities, which also enjoy the ability to raise capital tax-free, participate in
markets and so also affect rates of return. But they appear to do so at vastly lower rates and
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and avoids public places, and . . . it [is] a fair presumption that secrecy
means impropriety.”127
Why is it that some churches expend less than 5% of the funds donated
to them on charity? Because they can. It seems unlikely that any church or
other entity would so brazenly flaunt the underlying purpose of its
charitable tax subsidy if such behavior were widely known to both that
church’s tithe-payers and to the tax-paying public. At the very least, no
entity would do so for long, as its actions would drive away donors or spur
legislative and executive authorities to action.
This is precisely why Form 990 exists in its present incarnation.128
Commenting about a recent amendment to Form 990, the IRS
Commissioner indicated that one of the IRS’s priorities in redesigning the
form was “to enhance transparency of the nonprofit sector by requiring

thus have a significantly less distorting effect on the economy. Cragun et al., supra note 40,
at 40. The authors point out the relative giving rates of a number of relevant entities:
For instance, the [LDS Church], which regularly trumpets its charitable
donations, gave about $1 billion to charitable causes between 1985 and 2008.
That may seem like a lot until you divide it by the twenty-three-year time span
and realize this church is donating only about 0.7 percent of its annual income.
Other religions are more charitable. For instance, the United Methodist Church
allocated about 29 percent of its revenues to charitable causes in 2010 . . . . One
calculation of the resources expended by 271 U.S. congregations found that, on
average, “operating expenses” totaled 71 percent of all the expenditures of
religions, much of that going to pay ministers’ salaries. Financial contributions
addressing the physical needs of the poor fall within the remaining 29 percent
of expenditures.
***
[C]omparing their charitable giving to the performance of secular charities
is informative. The American Red Cross spends 92.1 percent of its revenue
directly addressing the physical needs of those it intends to help; only 7.9
percent is spent on “operating expenses.” If you use a generous 50 percent
cutoff for indicating whether an institution is primarily a charitable
organization or not (that is, they spend more than 50 percent of revenue on
charitable work addressing physical needs), we doubt there is a single religion
in the world that would actually qualify as a charitable organization.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Apparently recognizing this, a number of churches voluntarily
disclose audited financial information. See, e.g., Seven Standards of Responsible
Stewardship, EVANGELICAL COUNCIL FOR FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.ecfa.org/
Content/Standards (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (listing standards for participating religious
organizations, including financial oversight and transparency).
127. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE
GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 114 (1913).
128. See, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 207.
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better data and making that data more publicly available.”129 Indeed, as the
Commissioner explained, “[t]ransparency is the linchpin of compliance,
[and] when the structure and operations of charitable organizations are
visible to all, the possibility of misuse and abuse is reduced.”130 There is
simply no real argument that this reasoning does not apply to churches
today, and there is no reason to think that such an imposition will cause any
harm.131
If anything, there is excellent reason to think that this need for
transparency is more urgent when applied to churches than in other nonprofit contexts.132 Churches exert a powerful psychological and cultural pull
on their adherents. Congregants look to church leaders for guidance and
leadership and will routinely accept statements from the pulpit as truthful or
as reliable, even if those statements are not internally consistent or are at
odds with other sources of information. This is not a critical or derogatory
statement; church and religion are fundamentally about accepting or
acknowledging a power greater than oneself, and that sort of acceptance
leads to a particular vulnerability when it comes to informational
asymmetry. A church is in a unique position to insulate itself from its
donors (or investors, if you will) because it can broadly claim to be “doing
good” or to be “spending wisely” with little internal pressure. Without the
government or another third party to apply any pressure toward
transparency or disclosure, this lack of oversight will ineluctably lead to a
129. Hearing on Tax-Exempt Charitable Orgs. Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of Steven T. Miller,
Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division, Internal Revenue Service).
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 1363 (calling this nondisclosure “one of the
biggest tax loopholes of all time”); see also Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt
Organizations Involving Television Ministries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 55 (1987) (“We are of the opinion that
there is not a constitutional prohibition on requiring churches to file Form 990 information
returns.”). In fact, Congress nearly imposed the 990 filing requirement on churches in 1969
but it retreated in the face of religious lobbying, particularly from Brigham Young
University, a subsidiary of the LDS Church, and the United States Catholic Conference. See
Brunson, supra note 79, at 5-6. These entities argued that the cost of disclosure would be too
large and that requiring such disclosure would harm the separation of church and state.
Although these arguments carried the day, they are rather weak considering the current
interplay between churches and the broader economy. See Montague, supra note 51, at 216
(indicating that the exemption arose at a time when churches were not supposed to engage in
“substantial commercial activity” (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 67 (1969))).
132. Montague, supra note 51, at 231-41 (discussing the influence and control religious
leaders can exert with respect to church governance).
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situation where churches tend to stray from the underlying goals of their
donations (whether received directly from their donors or derivatively from
taxpayers) to a greater degree than other charities that neither have
psychological power over their donors nor are permitted to operate without
any disclosure whatsoever.
Many of the broader economic arguments set forth in this Article apply
generally to all tax-exempt charities. But churches, given their lack of
reporting requirements and their unique role in society, are different. They
have a compounded ability to mislead or stray from the charitable purposes
that justify their unique status.133 The reason why there are so many
churches with significant profit-seeking activity is simple: because they
can. They can because there is simply nothing preventing them from doing
so. As such, it is especially important that churches should disclose their
finances; it is especially the case that, for churches, “[t]ruth never damages
a cause that is just.”134
The second proposal is a subsequent, contingent one. Given the almost
total opacity of how much money churches bring in and how they spend
that money, a serious conversation and debate should occur following the
imposition of the reporting requirement discussed above. Once there is an
actual accounting, society can determine whether churches spend “enough”
on charity. This would clearly be a value-laden conversation. As discussed
above, there is some argument as to what should qualify as “charity.” 135
And there would also be substantial debate as to what qualifies as
“enough.”
Such an argument and conversation is a legitimate and important one to
have. Perhaps churches donate more than it appears to charitable causes,
and perhaps the public would be perfectly content with the manner in which
these entities are utilizing their tax subsidies. If that is the case, then society
benefits by having an honest conversation, informed by concrete figures
and clear accounting, about how tax subsidies are spent.
133. See supra note 49, acknowledging the potentially broad bases for churches’ special
treatment but arguing that the policies inherent in this area of the law are rationally, and
historically, grounded in charity that is directed outward from the church and designed to
help the poor and aid society.
134. 2 M.K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENCE IN PEACE AND WAR 162 (1949), https://archive.org/
details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174816/page/n173. Some may argue that financial disclosure is
more complex than this statement implies. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 79, at 2
(“Disclosure should be instrumental, not an end in itself.”). Building on Form 990 should
substantially counter such arguments, as this form already represents the considered
enforcement and compliance policies and goals of the IRS.
135. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 43, at 1381.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

490

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:453

On the other hand, if churches donate less to the needy than is generally
believed,136 then there is a powerful argument that churches should be taxed
upon their capital inflows—from whatever source derived—to the extent
that such capital is not redirected by the recipient to “charitable works.”137
This is not a novel suggestion in the charitable realm, and it finds its
basis in the law applicable to private foundations.
[T]ax law requires through excise tax enforcement that a private
foundation make distributions for charitable, educational,
religious, and similar kinds of purposes. These distributions are
called “qualifying distributions” . . . [and are effected by
requiring] the distributions for each year . . . to equal the greater
of the foundation’s adjusted net income for the tax year or a
minimum percentage of its investment assets as valued for the
tax year.138
Congress mandated these kinds of distributions in the Tax Reform Act of
1969.139 This mandate arose out of the concern that private foundations
were accumulating funds for private, non-charitable purposes without
consequence, and were thereby creating a professional class of highly
compensated administrators who were, in actuality, the only group to
significantly benefit from private foundations and their corresponding tax
subsidies.140 As such, a fee or tax was required to provide for the “vigorous
and extensive administration . . . needed in order to provide appropriate

136. See sources cited supra note 45.
137. This idea holds regardless of the organizational structure of the church, of which
there are many. See, e.g., ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 39, at 542–49. A contribution to any
type of organization is deductible, so that deduction can be eliminated for any type of
organization.
138. Charitable Giving ¶ 30.19 (Westlaw, Thomson Reuters, Tax & Accounting 2017)
(citing I.R.C. §§ 4942(c), 4942(d), 4942(e) (2012)); see also I.R.C. §§ 4940, 4944 (imposing
an excise tax on the net investment income of private foundations and on certain investments
that may jeopardize a private foundation’s tax-exempt purpose).
139. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
140. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRC 4942(G) – QUALIFYING DISTRIBUTIONS (1988),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicd88.pdf; Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107. A
similar concern—with a similar governmental response—arises in connection with
university and college endowments. See, e.g., Andrew Kreighbaum, Final GOP Deal Would
Tax
Large
Endowments,
INSIDE
HIGHER
ED
(Dec.
18,
2017),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/12/18/large-endowments-would-be-taxedunder-final-gop-tax-plan.
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assurances that private foundations will promptly and properly use their
funds for charitable purposes.”141
The parallel here is clear: churches that distribute little or nothing to
charity accumulate wealth without oversight. And wealth is not the only
thing they accumulate. These entities grow a seemingly endless supply of
hangers-on, professionals, and administrators who benefit from an
extraordinary concentration of wealth that is never distributed or given
away.142 Directing little to none of their tax-exempt donations to charity,
these individuals become the only class genuinely benefiting from the tax
subsidies afforded by the American taxpayer.143
Presuming these individuals to be rational economic actors, they are
simply doing what they are reasonably expected to do. They are directly
incentivized to minimize charitable contributions in order to maximize
accumulated wealth and preserve their direct financial stake in what
becomes, in essence, a financially conservative and entirely tax-benefit141. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 19 (1969). This approach has been echoed by other
commentators who have studied tax-exempt organizations, albeit in a different context and
for different reasons. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35, at 10–11 (recommending taxation of
currently exempt entities that “conduct active commercial businesses” and 501(c)(3) public
charities with substantial assets that are not used for charitable purposes).
142. See, e.g., Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107 (discussing the “growing
perception among lawmakers that private foundations, with their small networks of financers
and administrators, were less accountable to the public than traditional charities” as the
motivation behind requiring foundations to distribute some funds each year). Admittedly, the
kinds of qualifying distributions required of private foundations generally include
“reasonable and necessary administrative expenses,” Betsy Buchalter Adler & Brigit
Kavanagh, Philanthropic Partnerships Using the “Out of Corpus” Rules, TAX’N EXEMPTS,
May/June 2010, at 19, 20, a concept that could include some of the outsized spending
churches currently devote to their own administrators.
143. And this is if one presumes that there is no fraud or outright financial chicanery
involved. Even if the administrators of these churches are entirely forthright in their personal
dealings (a supposition there is much reason to doubt—see, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at
232 (“Another study found that in 2000, an estimated $7 billion was embezzled by leaders of
churches and religious organizations in the United States.”))—and even if they are not
compensated at outrageous rates (another supposition there is much reason to doubt—see,
e.g., Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 983 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994) (listing some of the incredible
compensation perks allotted to the Bakkers, including “a luxury parsonage, complete with an
air-conditioned treehouse and personal waterslide”))—these people are still, by definition,
the only ones who benefit from the money flowing to churches when that money stays
within the confines of the churches. Indeed, there is reason to think that churches are
particularly susceptible to the kind of abuse that disclosure and transparency would help
prevent. See, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 231–46 (discussing social and cultural factors
that can lead to fraud, abuse, and corruption in a church setting).
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seeking enterprise.144 Of course, as discussed above, this behavior does not
have the society-fortifying effect sought by the government and instead
undermines and distorts the broader economy. It essentially becomes an
inevitable mutation greatly benefiting the individuals who are in a position
to direct the investment strategies of churches. Recognizing this parallel,
the government should turn to the remedy it has crafted with respect to
private foundations and similarly craft a required distribution regime for
churches.145
The requirements applicable to foundations are quite technical and
specific, and this Article is not suggesting a direct application of these
principles to churches.146 Indeed, any such analysis would be premature
prior to a thorough review of the information that would be provided by
requiring churches to report their finances.147
144. In fact, the predictability of this behavior is an implicit conclusion of this Article.
Professional clergy are provided with a completely opaque and culturally favored investment
vehicle that is tax-incentivized to hold and invest funds. Such a vehicle protects their social
and economic position and permits an ever-expanding pursuit of additional opportunities and
contributors. If a publicly traded corporation were permitted to keep all of its activities secret
and allowed to raise and invest tax-free funds, what would it do? It would do exactly the
same thing, never returning or distributing any donations because it would be economically
foolish to do so. Churches—and the paid professionals who run them—are doing just that,
simply responding to the incentives put to them by the IRC. Draining the situation of moral
or ethical overtones, what can really be expected, and what blame can really be assigned?
The constructive approach is to identify the situation as an institutionalized moral hazard and
attempt to remedy it.
145. Note that much of the reasoning supporting the adoption of this second
recommendation may apply to non-church charities as well. However, such an extension is
outside the scope of this Article. It also seems—given the scope of the “non-charity
spending problem” and the cultural issues inherent in a church setting—that churches may
be more likely to need this nudging toward charitable behavior than, say, the Red Cross or a
hospital. Again, though, the thesis of this Article obviates any need for such an analysis or
discussion here.
146. See, e.g., John Dedon & Benjamin Kinder, Cautionary Guidance for Operating a
Private Foundation, EST. PLAN., Feb. 2017, at 9, 11-13 (noting numerous complications of,
and restrictions placed upon, private foundations, including an excise tax tied to net
investment income, prohibited transactions with “disqualified persons,” qualifying
distributions tied to a foundation’s investment assets, prohibitions on excessive or risky
business holdings, imposition of “taxable expenditure” rules, and restrictions on donations to
foreign organizations).
147. For example, most churches spend perhaps 10-20% of their tithed funds on
“management and overhead.” Going forward, that figure could become a benchmark as to
the spending levels permitted on that line item with exempt funds. In a sense, what this
argument is suggesting is that society carefully re-evaluate the definition of charity, found in
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iv), as including a description as broad as “advancement of
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Instead, it is enough here to argue that the broad principle of enforced
distributions should apply. Generally speaking, churches should be required
to pay tax on all funds that are not redirected to “charitable purposes,”
however such phrase is ultimately defined. Doing so will place churches on
the same footing with other market-facing entities by effectively
eliminating the tax shelter churches now enjoy when they eschew charity in
favor of profit-seeking.
Let us return to our example above one last time. Recall that X Corp. and
Church A are both examining whether to invest in a residential development
and that, assuming they both have a 10% benchmark for return on
investment, only Church A will be able to pay the $5,000,000 asking price
(thus pressuring rates of return available across the spectrum to all entities).
If, however, the money raised by Church X is taxed, then it will have to
generate $6,250,000 in order to have $5,000,000 in expendable funds.148 Its
10% benchmark now requires it to pursue a different opportunity—one that
will return $625,000, placing it in the same position as X Corp.149 This
religion.” See supra note 49 and accompanying text. If “advancement of religion” is being
used as cover to justify spending 2-3% on the needy, society should know that and decide
whether that is consistent with the underlying rationale of the tax subsidy. That kind of reevaluation is an intensely fact-intensive analysis that involves a lot of value and policy
judgments—the primary point is that, right now, our society is reaching its conclusions with
no facts.
148. We are assuming equivalent tax rates. Setting tax rates is a complicated political
process and is well outside the scope of the simplified issues and examples discussed herein.
Assuming equivalent rates is helpful here because it demonstrates how a simple tweak to the
tax code can place churches and for-profit entities on the same footing.
149. Note that this proposal does not require churches to pay taxes on the money
generated by their active pursuit of profits. In theory, this is already required under the
current law. See, e.g., Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 118 (“Exempt-organization
business income taxation was designed to place unrelated activities of exempt organizations
on an equal footing with similar activities carried out by taxable entities.”); see also
Brunson, supra note 120, at 230–32 (describing the implementation of the UBIT as an
attempt to prevent for-profit businesses owned by tax-exempt entities from escaping taxation
and so preventing an unfair advantage); Sharpe, supra note 30, at 382–98 (discussing the
history behind the adoption of the UBIT and the rationale thereof, grounded in the idea that
exempt entities should not be able to engage in unrelated activities and so “gain competitive
advantage over private enterprise” (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (1950) (message from
the President to the United States))). The concept behind the UBIT—focused as it is on
active profit-seeking and the unfair competition arising therefrom—is very similar to that
discussed in this Article; commentators have traditionally cast the unfair advantage that
UBIT is meant to avoid as having two parts: (1) because tax-exempt entities do not pay tax,
they can charge lower prices and still earn the same return as their competitors, and (2)
because tax-exempt entities can accumulate earnings more quickly, they can grow faster and
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means that churches will no longer have first access to the “best”
opportunities but instead will be subsidized only when they engage in
charity.150
This is, of course, a very broad recommendation. Tax strategy is a highly
complex and technical pursuit, and this Article does not intend to address
all aspects of how such a system would work.151 It is enough that, pursuant
have a lower risk of bankruptcy or insolvency. See Brunson, supra note 120, at 232; see also
Hansmann, supra note 106, at 611 (“The more compelling view . . . is that corporate income
tax does affect the cost of capital at the margin and that, everything else being equal, taxexempt corporations have higher rates of return on investment than those of taxable firms.
Thus, tax-exempt firms can earn a profit at prices below those at which taxable firms can
break even.”). This Article is based on precisely the same concern, but at an earlier stage of
the profit-seeking process. That is, it is concerned with the “front-end” of the church-charity
industry, the manner in which these entities first raise the money they utilize. The UBIT is
directed to the “back-end” of the industry—the manner in which those funds are then used
(which use potentially benefits from tax exemption). This Article focuses on the distortions
arising from how an organization’s donated capital is taxed, not on how it is spent or
invested.
150. This is because church funds spent on charity will remain untaxed. Note, too, that
this does not require a change to the law permitting taxpayers to deduct charitable
contributions. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012). This can stand as-is so long as churches are taxed on
funds not spent on charity. Another way of viewing the problem is that it essentially arises
from the divorce of churches from their source of capital (their donors). Corporations have
no such divorce from their source of capital and so, being a mere conduit for the economic
goals of others, have to capture the tax status of their shareholders. Imposing a tax on
churches evens the score by imposing the same tax ramifications on churches as on everyone
else because it requires churches to view the world through the eyes of their tax-paying
donors in the same manner as corporations have to view the world through the eyes of their
tax-paying shareholders.
151. In particular, it seems likely that what qualifies as “charity” would be a tricky and
intrinsically subjective determination. Charities, like all organizations, have some overhead.
Would rent for headquarters qualify? Salaries? Bonuses? What about money expended on
world-class healthcare for high-level functionaries? Or would it be easier for the law to
simply set a presumably acceptable overhead rate, such as 20% of all funds raised?
Similarly, how quickly would a church have to expend funds in order to avoid taxation?
Could they wait a year? Two years? What if there are no suitable charitable objects
available—should there be an exception granted in certain circumstances? These are
interesting questions that would have significant effects on individual entities. See, e.g.,
Miller, supra note 35, at 500–01 (briefly examining some specific suggestions and indicating
that Congress “could appropriately provide that any public charity whose assets are not
directly used for charitable purposes exceed a threshold amount and consistently exceed a
stated multiple of its average annual expenditures would be taxable to the extent of its nonUBTI investment income (or possibly the sum of its net non-UBTI investment income plus
new contributions) that is (are) not used directly for charitable purposes”); Sharpe, supra
note 30, at 412–43 (discussing the definition of “trade or business” and “substantially
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to the first recommendation above, churches will have to disclose where
their funds go and that those funds that do not go to charity will be treated
just like all other funds in the marketplace.152
Conclusion
The problems identified in this Article are significant. The LDS Church
is a poignant example. This is unsurprising because it is a cogent
representation of the problems that can result from an unmonitored and
unchecked system of charitable taxation. But this is not only an issue for the
LDS Church, nor is it really an issue of greed or even blame. All churches
are permitted to operate secretly, and all churches receive tax-free
contributions and are given other substantial tax exemptions. This
combination of secrecy and special tax treatment pushes tax-exempt entities
away from the very charitable acts they are supposed to perform and into
profit-seeking endeavors. It is simply a situation of churches (and their
minders) reacting rationally to the incentives placed before them. Because
churches can raise money and funds at a lower price than others, they have
an incentive to do so as much as possible and put those funds to use in a
manner that makes economic sense for them.
In such an economic and tax regime, one may end up reasonably
confusing spirituality and capital pursuits. But a lack of culpability does not
make it right. What we end up with is a system that does not result in the
kind of charity it purports to stimulate but instead distorts the broader
economy and harms investors throughout the American marketplace. This
situation should not be acceptable to the U.S. taxpayer.
The government should foreclose this kind of behavior by requiring
churches to disclose their finances and levy a tax on money that does not go
to charity. In the end, the taxpayer has made a very conscious investment in
a clearly defined set of goods and services, and charities should have to
deliver on that investment.
related” in the context of the UBIT at length, concepts that could be usefully applied to
separate “non-profit” from “profit”). Ultimately, in the context of this Article, these are mere
details. But see ZELINSKY, supra note 51, at 113-56 (arguing that taxation of churches risks
undue entanglement and pointing out that these sorts of subjective decisions inherently affect
religion in a negative way). Simply accepting that funds that are not spent on charity should
be taxed will have the desired impact, regardless of what technical aspects end up being
implemented.
152. “Distortions are bad because they change what an actor would do in a tax-free
world; in the interest of efficiency, the tax law tries to minimize the effect that taxes have on
taxpayers’ decisions.” Brunson, supra note 120, at 250.
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